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Summary 
The present report aimed at reviewing both the theoretical as well as the empirical literature on 
food fraud, which is usually defined as deception for economic gain using food. More specifically, 
the overall goal was to provide a review of existing analyses addressing food fraud from a social 
sciences perspective. For this purpose, relevant literature was searched, reviewed and analysed 
in order to provide a solid knowledgebase for further discussions among regulatory bodies, policy 
makers, private businesses and scientists, regarding how to address fraudulent activities in food 
supply chains, especially regarding setting up appropriate prevention measures. 
Based on the review several central points emerged.  
First, no harmonised definition of food fraud exists and food fraud can appear in many different 
forms such as adulteration, counterfeiting or mislabelling. Thus, food fraud is a multifaceted 
problem and can have very different impacts on consumers ranging from direct health treats 
such as the consumption of toxic contaminants to technical threats such as the mislabelling of 
the country of origin.   
Second, given the lack of statistics about food fraud incidents - due to its very nature - statements 
about its extent and severity are based on detected cases and educated guesses. According to 
existing knowledge, food fraud in the EU seems to be especially pronounced for products such 
as olive oil, spices, honey, and fish/seafood. However, at the same time it needs to be kept in 
mind that the higher share of products found to be adulterated in these categories might also be 
a direct result of a higher control intensity for these food groups due to previous food fraud cases.  
Third, even though organised criminal groups (food mafia) seem to play a certain role in 
fraudulent activities in the food sector, in most cases it might be more reasonable to assume that 
ordinary businesses are involved in fraudulent activities. Thus, the routine activity and situational 
prevention theory, both applied in the field of criminology, as well as the economics of crime 
approach seem to be highly relevant concepts for the analysis of food fraud.  
Fourth, vulnerability assessments should be considered as integral parts of food fraud 
management systems. Food fraud vulnerability is thereby determined by three key elements: 
opportunities, motivations and control measures. The overall goal of such assessments is to 
identify potential vulnerabilities in order to be able to set up countermeasures to minimise the 
incentives for individuals and businesses to engage in fraudulent activities. 
Fifth, based on the existing knowledge from known food fraud incidents and vulnerability 
assessments, both macro- and micro-level factors must be considered simultaneously to assess 
fraud vulnerability and to set up and implement effective prevention strategies. Especially 
important factors to consider seem to be the ease and detection of adulteration of a certain raw 
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material, the presence of added value claims (e.g., organic, Protected Designation of Origin), and 
the complexity of the value chain (e.g., low transparency and traceability increases vulnerability).  
Sixth, there is evidence that existing legal enforcement powers are not always used to their full 
extent, and control officials' orders would be more effective if the sanctions for disobeying were 
rapid and sufficiently severe. In this context, it has been argued that fines are only one element 
of a food fraud fighting strategy which should also include other elements such as the withdrawal 
of licenses and authorisations, ‘naming and shaming’ techniques, and human capacity building 
measures.  
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1 Introduction 
Food fraud is not a new phenomenon but, in fact, has a long history as references to the 
adulteration of food found in texts dating back to the days of the Roman Empire indicate (CAFIA, 
2015; Lotta & Bogue, 2015; Shears, 2010). However, it has recently gained increasing attention 
as reflected in the number of scientific publications on the topic (Huck et al., 2016), as well as in 
the setting up of several initiatives to tackle food fraud, such as the EU Food Fraud Network (FFN) 
(Montanari et al., 2016). The FFN was established in 2014 as a reaction to the so-called horsemeat 
scandal1. In the aftermath of this scandal, the European Commission (2013) published a report, 
in which it was explicitly stated that even though no statistics exist on the incidence of food fraud, 
the EU Commission has identified food fraud as a new area of action. Besides these actions 
undertaken in Europe, other countries such as the United States and China have also set up 
different initiatives to address the topic of food fraud specifically (Spink et al., 2016a). Thus, food 
fraud has gained increasing attention as an important food risk and seems to rank high on the 
agenda of regulators and food industry stakeholders alike (Bouzembrak & Marvin, 2016; Ellis et 
al., 2015). 
It is often argued that the increasing globalisation of food supply chains (FSCs) has contributed 
to an increase in food fraud activities, since the detection of fraud has become harder where FSCs 
are complex and food commodities change hands a number of times (e.g. Manning, 2016; NSF, 
2014). At the same time, increasingly globalised FSCs imply that the impact of food fraud 
incidents can have internationally far-reaching consequences (Spink et al., 2017). Moreover, 
concerns have been expressed that food fraud risks may be more severe than traditional food 
safety risks, since adulterants used in fraudulent activities are often unconventional and current 
food protection systems are not designed to look for the nearly infinite number of potential 
adulterants (Spink & Moyer, 2011). This point might be illustrated with the widespread 
adulteration of milk products with melamine in China in 2008 with lethal consequences2. Since 
melamine is neither a permitted additive nor a food ingredient, established food systems did not 
detect this substance until health problems were reported and linked to the baby formula milk. 
Thus, only since the melamine contamination reported in China in 2008, the adulteration of 
protein-based food products with melamine has become a well-known issue. This case illustrates 
two important points in the context of food fraud: First, given the large number of potential 
adulterants in food the increasing development and application of untargeted analytical 
                                                            
1 The horsemeat scandal refers to the presence of horsemeat in pre-prepared food, mainly lasagne and burgers, 
without any declaration of horse meat on the package, food label or ingredients list in several EU countries in 
2012/2013 (Agnoli et al., 2016). 
2  Melamine is a synthetic chemical that was added to raw milk to increase the apparent protein content. In 
September 2008, Sanlu brand milk powder was found to cause an outbreak of kidney disease, due to the baby 
formula being contaminated by melamine. Six babies died and 294 000 were hospitalized by consuming the tainted 
formula (Wu et al., 2017). 
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laboratory approaches (i.e. methods that detect abnormalities without a priori knowledge about 
potential adulterants) offers a promising technical solution to detect food fraud (e.g. Esslinger et 
al., 2014). Second, even though such technical solutions are definitely important and promising 
tools with regard to the detection of food fraud, given budget and time constraints they need to 
be coupled to a risk-based control plan in order to decrease the likelihood of food fraud at 
reasonable costs. Especially, identifying existing vulnerabilities inherent in FSCs seems to be one 
important part for setting up successful and cost-effective food fraud prevention strategies (e.g. 
Cavin et al., 2016). 
Given this background, the present report aims at contributing to the discussion about food fraud 
prevention by providing a review of the current knowledge on the topic. The report focuses 
thereby particularly on the evolving literature analysing food fraud from a social science 
perspective. So far, there is a small and fragmented, but growing literature on food fraud located 
across academic journals associated with food science and criminology (Smith et al., 2017). Yet, 
other disciplines such as economics are also highly relevant for the analysis and prevention of 
fraud in general and food fraud in particular. Consequently, this report aims at providing a 
multidisciplinary review of the state of the art in approaches to prevent, detect and mitigate food 
fraud drawing on literature from the fields of (agricultural) economics, business management, 
economic sociology and criminology.  
The report is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of important 
definitions and terminology used in the context of food fraud. Thereafter, main legislations, 
regulations as well as non-governmental initiatives regarding food fraud are briefly outlined. 
Section 4 introduces important theoretical frameworks relevant for the analysis of food fraud. In 
section 5, existing databases providing empirical evidence on the extent and scope of food fraud 
are presented, followed by so far existing food fraud prevention-models. Section 6 discusses the 
major outcomes of this report and concludes with providing recommendations for possible 
future steps. 
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2 Definitions and terminology 
Given a range of different terminologies surrounding the topic of food fraud, this section will 
provide an overview of major keywords and the underlying definitions and concepts in order to 
ensure a common understanding.  
As pointed out by Lord et al. (2017b) at its most basic level, the concept of fraud is ‘a way of 
making money illegally via deception’ that involves a process of some form of dishonest or 
deceptive practice and an outcome that is some form of advantage as a ‘goal’.  
Furthermore, these authors conceptualise food fraud as “relating to the abuse or misuse of an 
otherwise legitimate business transaction and an otherwise legitimate social/economic 
relationship in the food system in which one or more actors undertake acts or omissions of 
deception or dishonesty to avoid legally prescribed procedures (process) with the intent to gain 
personal or organisational advantage or cause loss/harm (outcome)”.  
At EU level, usually four different criteria are applied to define food fraud: (1) violation of food 
law, (2) committed intentionally, (3) in pursue an economic or financial gain and (4) by 
deceiving consumers3. 
Most of the available scientific studies so far adopted the definition proposed by Spink and Moyer 
(2011) defining food fraud as the deliberate substitution, addition, tampering, or 
misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, or food packaging, or false or misleading 
statements made about a product for economic gain. 
Besides, the term food crime is sometimes used in the scientific literature and public media. 
Croall (2007) introduced the concept of food crime, defining it as the ‘many crimes that are 
involved in the production, distribution and selling of basic foodstuffs’. However, in the more 
recent literature about food fraud a narrower definition of food crime has been introduced. 
According to Elliott (2014), food crime is used to refer to food fraudulent activities carried out 
by organised criminal groups. In this line, the National Food Crime Unit (2016) pointed out that 
the distinction between food fraud and food crime is generally one of scale and complexity, with 
the former sometimes an early indicator of the latter. Hence, the term food crime refers to 
fraudulent schemes conducted by organised networks as opposed to fraudulent activities carried 
out by individual business operators (Montanari et al., 2016). However, since it might not always 
be feasible or meaningful to distinguish between these two, the umbrella term food related 
criminality or simply food criminality has been introduced by several institutions/scholars 
(Fassam & Dani, 2017; National Food Crime Unit, 2016).  
                                                            
3 Currently no harmonised definition of food fraud exists at EU level (https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/food-
fraud_en)  
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For the sake of clarity, this report will only use the term food fraud or fraudulent activities to 
refer to all kinds of food-related criminal activities disregarding of their scale and scope.  
Several scholars provide further a more detailed categorization of food fraud activities. Spink et 
al. (2016b), for example, proposed to distinguish seven categories of food fraud, namely (i) 
adulteration, (ii) tamper, (iii) over-run, (iv) theft, (v) diversion, (vi) simulation, and (vii) 
counterfeiting. A more detailed description for each of these seven categories is provided in table 
1.  
The sub-category of adulteration is often referred to as economically motivated adulteration 
(EMA) of food and/or food ingredients and has received most attention in the literature so far 
(e.g. Everstine et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2012b; Spink & Moyer, 2011)4. Lotta and Bogue (2015) 
added to this discussion that food fraud types might be classified according to three main 
categories, namely food adulteration, misrepresentation and food related crimes, which usually 
entail the violation of non-food laws such as for example tax law or intellectual property rights. 
Table 1: Categories of food fraud 
Term Definition Example 
Adulteration  
(adulterant-substance) 
A component of the finished product is 
fraudulent 
Melamine added to milk 
Tampering Legitimate product and packaging are used in a 
fraudulent way (Includes mislabeling) 
Changed expiry information, 
product up-labeling, religious 
designation, etc. 
Over-run and 
unauthorised production 
Legitimate product is made in excess of 
production agreements 
Under-reporting of production 
Theft Legitimate product is stolen and passed off as 
legitimately procured 
Stolen products are co-mingled 
with legitimate products. 
Diversion or grey market The sale or distribution of legitimate products 
outside of intended markets (Includes 
smuggling) 
Relief food redirected to 
markets where aid is not 
required 
Simulation Illegitimate product is designed to look like but 
not exactly copy the legitimate product 
“Knock-offs” of popular foods 
not produced with same food 
safety assurances 
Counterfeiting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) infringement, 
that could include all aspects of the fraudulent 
product and packaging being fully replicated  
Copies of popular foods not 
produced with the same food 
safety assurances 
Source: Spink et al. (2016b) 
                                                            
4  Instead of adulteration, sometimes the term intended contamination is used in contrast to unintended 
contamination (Davidson et al., 2017). 
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Another proposed way to differentiate among food fraud activities is to take into account the 
impact of food fraud activities onto consumers. The Food Standards Agency in the United 
Kingdom for example differentiates between two types of food fraud. The first type comprises 
food that is unfit and potentially harmful and the second one refers to the deliberate mis-
categorisation of food. While the first category poses health risks to consumers, the latter 
category is not necessarily unsafe but deceives the consumer as to the real nature of the product. 
A similar categorisation was proposed by Spink and Moyer (2011), who distinguish between three 
different types of food fraud risks to public health:  
(i) Direct food fraud risks, i.e. immediate health consequences for example through acutely 
toxic contaminants; 
(ii) Indirect food fraud risks, i.e. health consequences through long-term exposure; 
(iii) Technical food fraud risks such as mislabelling of the origin or ingredients. 
Overall, these sub-categories of food fraud might overlap and should not be interpreted as 
sharply delineated categories but rather as tools to aid in understanding food fraud activities (van 
der Meulen, 2015). Nevertheless, these different types of categorisation underline how 
multifaceted the problem of food fraud is. 
Further terms that can be found in the literature on food fraud are food defence, food 
protection, food fraud resilience, food authenticity and food integrity.  
Food defence is by some scholars defined as intentional adulteration of food in order to create 
harm, in contrast to food fraud, which is considered an intentional act for economical gain (e.g. 
Manning & Soon, 2016; Spink, 2014). Therefore, the underlying motivation (creating harm versus 
economic gain) differentiates food defence from food fraud according to these studies. Other 
scholars propose a wider definition of food defence referring to the methodology and 
countermeasures taken to prevent and mitigate the effects of intentional incidents and threats 
to the food chain (Davidson et al., 2017). Closely connected to food defence is food protection, 
which some authors use as an umbrella term comprising food quality, food safety, food fraud, 
and food defence (Spink, 2014). 
Food fraud resilience is sometimes used to refer to how well organisations protect themselves 
against fraud (Daly & Gee, 2016)5, while food or FSC integrity is referred to as a multifaceted 
concept to provide assurance to consumers and other stakeholders about the safety, authenticity 
and quality of food6. The latter concept encompasses thereby food safety, security, traceability, 
origin authenticity, quality attributes and product information resulting in a final food product 
with integrity (Elliott, 2014). In this context, Manning (2016) proposed to differentiate four 
                                                            
5 Resilience in common language refers to the ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change 
(https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resilience) 
6 https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/foodintegrity/index.cfm  
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elements of food integrity, namely product, process, people, and data integrity. Product integrity 
refers to the inherent quality attributes of totality or completeness that is to the product’s 
intrinsic characteristics. Process integrity refers to the activities undertaken to produce the food 
encompassing the design, assurance, monitoring and verification of processes within the product 
lifecycle to ensure that they remain authentic and intact (extrinsic product characteristics)7. 
People integrity can be described as the honesty and morals exhibited by an individual and/or 
group and data integrity refers to the consistency and accuracy of information accompanying 
the food item throughout the supply chain. Thus, fraudulent activities can affect each of these 
four elements of food integrity.  
With regard to food fraud prevention, terms such as risk, vulnerability, threats and mitigation 
are often used. Vulnerability of a certain FSC usually refers to the degree to which a system is 
likely to experience harm due to exposure to a hazard8 (Füssel, 2007). Vulnerability is thus an 
assessment of how well or how poorly protected the FSC is against fraud. Put differently, 
vulnerability is a weak point where fraud is more likely to occur. The terms risk and vulnerability 
are often used interchangeably in the literature on food fraud (Silvis et al., 2017). Moreover, 
vulnerability is not static but may be reduced by mitigation measures which are measures taken 
to decrease vulnerability to a certain type of fraud in a given supply chain. 
To sum up, even though no uniform or harmonised definition of food fraud does exist so far, all 
existing definitions refer in some way to the violation of legally defined rules or procedures, 
deception of other stakeholders and the intent to gain a personal or business advantage. 
Moreover, different types of fraud exist with different severity on public health. With respect to 
food fraud prevention, different terminologies are used across and within different scientific 
disciplines (e.g. risk, threat, vulnerability, integrity, authenticity). Nevertheless, disregarding the 
different terminologies employed, the general aim is to identify possible weaknesses in FSC that 
might give ground for fraudulent activities and based on this identification to design and 
implement prevention (mitigation) measures to decrease the likelihood of fraudulent activities. 
Such a risk or vulnerability assessment is the core of most existing food fraud (prevention) models 
and will be discussed in more detail in section 4 and 5.  
                                                            
7  Intrinsic product characteristics refer to attributes that are part of the physical product (e.g., sensory 
characteristics, ingredients, nutritional composition), whereas extrinsic characteristics are not part of the physical 
product and can be modified without changing the characteristics of the product (e.g., price, brand, package, health 
claims) (Olson & Jacoby, 1972).  
8 A hazard is thereby an existing condition or possible (under current conditions) situation that has the potential to 
cause harm. 
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3  Regulatory frameworks and international standards 
Food authorities usually regulate FSCs through a mix of different tools such as mandatory laws, 
legal sanctions, bonds to norms and human capacity building (Bavorová et al., 2014). The 
following section will provide a brief overview of different regulatory tools implemented both by 
governments (EU-level, national level) and non-governmental organisations that are considered 
as highly relevant for the topic of food fraud.  
3.1 Governmental actions 
3.1.1 EU level  
The central legislations that currently govern the EU food chain are (Montanari et al., 2016):  
(i) EU Regulation 2017/625 on official controls and other official activities, published in the 
Official Journal on 7 April 2017, which replaces Regulation (EU) 882/2004,  
(ii) EC Regulation 178/2002 which lays down the general principles and requirements of food 
law, the establishment of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and defines 
procedures in matters of food safety, and  
(iii) Regulation No. (EU) 1169/2011 on the provision of food information to consumers – also 
known as FIC Regulation. 
Article 8 of EC Regulation 178/2002 addresses the protection of consumers’ interests in the 
European Union (EU) and states that food law shall aim at the protection of the interests of 
consumers and ‘‘shall provide a basis for consumers to make informed choices in relation to the 
foods they consume. It shall aim at the prevention of: (a) fraudulent or deceptive practices; (b) 
the adulteration of food; and (c) any other practices which may mislead the consumer’’. Food 
Law Regulation 178/2002 also requires the establishment of a traceability system for all food 
products stating that the detail of traceability is to be extended also to each ingredient of the 
food. Traceability is thereby defined as “the ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food- 
producing animal or substance intended to be, or expected to be incorporated into a food or 
feed, through all stages of production, processing and distribution.” The General Food Law, 
however, does not state any specific method or technique that food operators have to follow 
(Dabbene et al., 2014). 
Moreover, article 50 of this regulation establishes the rapid alert system for food and feed 
(RASFF) as a network involving the Member States, the Commission as member and manager of 
the system and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Whenever a member of the network 
has any information relating to the existence of a serious direct or indirect risk to human health 
deriving from food or feed, this information is immediately notified to the Commission under the 
RASFF. The Commission immediately transmits this information to the members of the network 
(European Commission, 2016).  
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The currently adopted Regulation 2017/625 supplements Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 by aiming 
at: (i) protection of human, animal and plant health and of the environment via veterinary and 
phytosanitary measures; (ii) consumer protection in the internal market; and (iii) animal welfare 
along the agri-food chain. The regulation states that these aims are to be achieved via a risk-
based approach meaning that competent authorities should perform regular official controls on 
risks associated with food, feed & animals (Art. 9). New key elements in this regulation are that 
(i) official controls must be performed in a manner that minimises the burden on businesses and 
(ii) in order to strengthen the fight against fraud it is required for competent authorities to take 
into account the likelihood of fraudulent and deceptive behaviours when deciding the 
appropriate frequency of controls.9  
Additionally, in response to the horsemeat scandal, the European Commission set up a Food 
Fraud Network (FFN) in 2014. The aim of this FFN is to allow the EU countries to work in 
accordance with the rules laid down in Articles 36-40 of the Official Controls Regulation 
(Regulation 882/2004, rules on administrative cooperation and assistance) in matters where the 
national authorities are confronted with possible intentional violations of food chain law with 
a cross-border impact. Moreover, in 2015 the Administrative Assistance and Cooperation 
System (AAC) was implemented as an Information Technology system, developed by the 
European Commission for EU countries to exchange data in a structured manner regarding non-
compliances with food and feed legislation.  
Besides, the Commission has the power to coordinate activities throughout the Union 
(Regulation 882/2004, Article 40), by enabling the recommendations of ad hoc plans aiming to 
establish the prevalence of hazards in food (Hyde & Savage, 2018). Such coordinate activities 
result in so-called coordinated control plans (CCPs) which have been set up in the aftermath of 
the horsemeat scandal for horsemeat (2013), honey (2015) and fish (2015). CCPs are set up for a 
limited time-period with the aim better to understand the extent of fraud in certain sectors. As 
phrased by Hyde and Savage (2018), CCPs perform the function of a day-to-day governance 
response to perceived food fraud.10 
Furthermore, OPSON11 operations have been carried out by INTERPOL and Europol since 2011. 
These operations are annual law enforcement operations with the objective to protect public 
health and safety through the seizure of counterfeit or substandard food and beverages and 
dismantling of the organised crime groups involved in this trafficking. OPSON operations were 
initiated by INTERPOL and Italian law enforcement authorities as a global response to the growing 
phenomenon of counterfeit and substandard products (INTERPOL, 2017). During these 
                                                            
9 https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/official_controls/legislation_en  
10 Readers with an interest in the details of these CCPs are referred to Hyde and Savage (2018) and the following 
link: https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/official_controls/eu-co-ordinated-control-plans_en.  
11 Opson means food in ancient Greek. 
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operations, agencies from law enforcement, customs and national food regulatory bodies 
conduct checks at different retail outlets as well as airports and sea ports to locate and confiscate 
counterfeit or substandard food products (INTERPOL, 2017). The results of these annual checks 
are published in an annual report highlighting, among others, the type of seized products and the 
reason for seizure (INTERPOL & Europol, 2016).  
The European Commission has responded also to the rise in food fraud by establishing the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in 1999 – European Commission, 1999/352 – to investigate 
frauds, including suspicions of fraud concerning agricultural products. The main task of OLAF is 
to protect the financial interests of the EU against systematic fraud of all kinds (European Anti-
Fraud Office, 2014). 
3.1.2 National level  
In Denmark, the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration Flying Squad is a Food Inspection 
Task Force that was established in 2006 in the wake of a meat scandal, involving the sale of out-
of-date frozen meat. This task force employs forensic accounting which refers to the audit of 
accounting records in search for evidence of fraud (fraud audit) and a fraud investigation to prove 
or disprove fraud (Singleton & Singleton, 2010). 
In the UK, food fraud is addressed by two food crime units, namely the National Food Crime Unit 
(NFCU) that was established by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) in December 2014 and the 
Scottish Food Crime and Incidents Unit (SFCIU) that was established in 2015. Both units were 
established in order to provide leadership in the prevention, investigation, and disruption of food 
crime and in the management of food safety incidents nationally (National Food Crime Unit, 
2016).  
In Germany, several initiatives have been set up in order to address food fraud. A national 
advisory council on food fraud has been established as well as a surveillance system called 
BeoWarn. Furthermore, a National Reference Centre for authenticity and integrity in the food 
chain was founded at the Max Rubner-Institute (MRI). The new centre will coordinate the 
research conducted at MRI and other research institutes in the field of food authenticity and act 
as a national contact point, connecting German expertise with the planned European Reference 
Centre for food authenticity and integrity and other institutions, advising all those involved12.  
The Netherlands is considered a pioneer in ensuring that compliance and enforcement are 
considered at the start of the rule-making process. Especially relevant for the case of food fraud 
seems to be the so-called Table of Eleven, which contains eleven different determinants of fraud 
and has widely influenced other countries’ efforts in this field (OECD, 2010). The Table of Eleven 
(T11) was developed jointly by the Ministry of Justice and Erasmus University and derives from 
                                                            
12 https://www.mri.bund.de/en/news/news/short-
message/?tx_news_pi1%5Bnews%5D=193&cHash=aff7606304535171c14bbce6d359e914  
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academic literature in the areas of social psychology, sociology and criminology, supplemented 
by the Ministry’s practical experiences and viewpoints on law enforcement. The T11 has been 
widely used by Dutch policymakers and researchers in the agri-food chain (van Asselt et al., 2016) 
and will be discussed in more detail in section 4.  
3.2 Non-governmental initiatives and standards 
Several business-led initiatives have been established in recent years addressing the topic of food 
fraud.  
The Food Industry Intelligence Network (FIIN) is an industry network that was established in 
2015, and currently has 21 members in the UK including retailers, manufacturers and food service 
companies. The aim is to share intelligence on food authenticity.  
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) is a business-driven initiative launched in 2000 for the 
continuous improvement of food safety management systems to ensure confidence in the 
delivery of safe food to consumers worldwide13. Key activities of the GFSI are: (i) to specify in its 
guidance document the requirements for food safety schemes and how these requirements 
should be implemented, controlled and monitored, and (ii) to drive global change through multi-
stakeholder projects on strategic food safety issues14. Since 2016, the GFSI Guidance Document 
includes new requirements for organisations to have a documented food fraud vulnerability 
assessment procedure in place and to implement measures to mitigate against the identified 
vulnerabilities15.  
Safe Supply of Affordable Food Everywhere (SSAFE) is a global non-profit membership 
organisation incorporated in 2006 to help integrate food safety, animal health and plant health 
across food supply chains to improve public health and wellbeing.  
Lastly, the Michigan State University (MSU) Food Fraud Initiative is an interdisciplinary research, 
education, and outreach organization focusing on all types of fraud that can contribute to public 
health and economic vulnerabilities and threats. This work is accomplished through collaboration 
between stakeholders from across industries, agencies, associations and other academics.  
With respect to international standards it has been pointed out that at present there are no 
international standardisation committees (e.g. ISO, CEN12, etc.) dedicated specifically to food 
authenticity and food fraud (Defra, 2015). This can be explained by the fact that the area is 
diverse and encompasses a multitude of analytical techniques (e.g. molecular biology, stable 
isotope ratio analysis, etc.) that would make the formation of a dedicated committee difficult at 
                                                            
13 http://www.mygfsi.com/component/content/article.html?id=190:gfsi-position-paper-on-mitigating-the-public-
health-risk-of-food-fraud 
14 https://www.mygfsi.com/about-us/about-gfsi/what-is-gfsi.html  
15 http://www.ssafe-food.org/our-projects/  
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a practical level. However, there are international standards implemented addressing the issue 
of traceability. As pointed out by Dabbene et al. (2014), the ISO 9000 series for Quality 
Management Systems contains a number of standards concerning traceability. ISO 22000:2005 
specifically addresses the establishment and application of a traceability system that enables the 
identification of product lots and their relation to batches of raw materials, processing and 
delivering records. ISO 22005:2007 introduces principles and basic requirements for the design 
and the implementation of a food (and feed) traceability system16. Even if it does not specify how 
this should be achieved, it introduces the requirement that organizations involved in FVCs have 
to define information that should be, at each stage, obtained and collected from the supplier and 
then provided to customers, in addition to product and processing history data.  
Besides, there are several private standards addressing the topic of traceability. GlobalG.A.P. and 
the British Retail Consortium (BRC) Best Practice Guidelines for Traceability, for example, set up 
requirements for traceability by providing principles of effective traceability system design and 
guidelines to undertake traceability tests (Dabbene et al., 2014).  
  
                                                            
16 https://www.iso.org/standard/36297.html  
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4 Analytical frameworks for fraudulent activities in food 
supply chains 
Different scientific disciplines are involved in the analysis of so-called regulatory non-compliance, 
which is also referred to as economic misconduct, economic opportunism, unethical behaviour17 
or white collar crime, which denotes criminal acts performed by white collar people who are 
respected members of the professions (Hirschauer & Zwoll, 2008). Food fraud can be considered 
as one form of such regulatory non-compliance, misconduct or unethical behaviour18. Thus, 
instead of considering food fraud as an exogenous phenomenon perpetrated by organised crime 
groups (Food Mafia), it might in most cases be better understood as an endogenous phenomenon 
within FSCs where criminal opportunities arise under certain conditions as part of legitimate 
actors’ routine behaviours (Lord et al., 2017a). Hence, this section aims at providing an overview 
of the contribution of difference scientific disciplines towards the analysis of regulatory non-
compliance in FSCs. These disciplines comprise among others, criminology and economics (e.g. 
microeconomics, management sciences, institutional and behavioural economics), whereby both 
disciplines have been influenced by sociological and psychological findings. 
4.1 Economic concepts 
Several studies have pointed out that misdirected incentives are a major source of food risks and 
that there are relevant constellations in FSCs where non-transparent markets and ill-enforced 
rules make non-compliance more profitable than compliance (e.g., Hennessy et al., 2003; 
Hirschauer et al., 2012). At the same time, it has been argued that the understanding of economic 
misconduct might be improved if one might consider the underlying decisions as being no 
different to any other business decisions carried out by economic actors (e.g. Hirschauer & Zwoll, 
2008; Lord et al., 2017a; 2017b).  
In microeconomics, problems linked with economic misconduct are usually addressed by game-
theory analysing incentive problems with principal-agent (PA) models. PA models usually rely on 
the assumption of rational actors that maximise their self-interest (Braun & Guston, 2003). That 
is, comparing an agent’s utility in case of compliance to her utility in case of non-compliance, the 
latter being weighted with a probability of detection (Herzfeld & Jongeneel, 2012). This type of 
                                                            
17 No uniform definition of unethical behaviour exists, but an ethical decision might be defined as a decision that is 
both legally and morally acceptable to the larger community. Conversely, an unethical decision might be defined as 
a decision that is either illegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community (Jones, 1991).  
18 The report by the National Food Crime Unit (2016) differentiates between food fraud, food crime and regulatory 
non-compliance stating that regulatory non-compliance is more common than food fraud or food crime but at their 
most serious, this may also constitute food crime. The present report acknowledges that there are different scales 
of regulatory non-compliance. However, since currently no indicator exists when non-compliance turns into food 
fraud, this section focuses on non-compliance in general comprising all forms of fraudulent activities.   
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models are based on the economics of crime approach introduced by Becker (1968) predicting 
that regulated entities comply with a given regulation when they conclude that the benefits of 
compliance, including averting fines or other sanctions, exceed the costs of compliance. Hence, 
PA models are used to provide a mental map of the economic incentive situation under 
consideration by analysing the positions of actors, the distribution of information between them, 
the different types of rules concerned, the physical opportunities for opportunism, the relevant 
economic parameters, and the (stochastic) influences from the environment. That is, they can 
help to understand the options available to FSC actors and the kind of parameters and their 
linkages determining the actors’ incentives (Hirschauer & Zwoll, 2008).  
However, it has been shown that people’s choices are not only motivated by economic self-
interest but also by non-economic considerations19. These non-economic considerations are also 
called social preferences or pro-social motivations and comprise among others, altruistic 
preferences and notions of fairness and reciprocity (e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Hirschauer et al., 
2012). Thus, economic research, which focuses on the role of trust and benevolence in economic 
relationships, is also highly relevant for the analysis of food fraud. From a modelling point of view, 
agent-based models (ABM) can be used to model non-compliance behaviour taking also social 
factors into account (van Asselt et al., 2016). 
In this context, it is important to refer to the concept of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality 
assumes that decision makers are intendedly rational. Yet, rationality is limited by the cognitive 
capacities of human beings and it is bounded by the context within which market actors are 
embedded (Biggart & Beamish, 2003; Jones, 1999). Examples of such cognitive limitations or 
mental short cuts can be found in a decision makers’ search behaviour, such as the fact that 
people do not consider all aspects of a decision facing them and might even ignore available 
information. The implication of bounded rationality is that any decision can be modelled as 
having two components: the extrinsic incentive structure and bounds on adaptability in the given 
decision-making situation (Jones, 1999). 
Moreover, institutional theory and institutional economics might offer valuable insights for the 
analysis of economic misconduct. Especially cultural theory might help explaining how aspects of 
the environment can shape cognitive limits to rationality (Vaughan, 1999). Historically grown 
institutional frameworks shape national business systems since firms are embedded in the social 
system, and so a firm’s decision must consider relevant institutional pressures such as 
government regulations, norms, or peers’ actions within the industry (Liu, 2016; Matten & Moon, 
2008). The institutional isomorphism theory (IIT) categorises these pressures into three types: 
coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive pressure 
originates from official pressures such as governmental regulations, whereas normative pressure 
                                                            
19 The literature also often refers to these different motivations as material versus non-material motivations.  
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mainly originates from public attention, meaning that firms tend to adopt practices recognised 
by public attention to improve their reputation. Mimetic pressure operates through the imitation 
of peers within the industry. In the context of economic misconduct, mimetic processes might 
refer to the fact that the relative share of firms performing economic misconduct within a 
particular industry critically determines the likelihood that peers will also adopt illegal practices 
(Liu, 2016). Consequently, according to IIT, a firm’s decision to commit economic misconduct 
does not only depend on profit and cost, but also takes regulatory control, public attention, and 
the degree of non-compliance within their business environment into consideration.  
To sum up, economic misconduct is determined by the individual’s cognitive abilities and 
constraints, organisational characteristics (structure, processes, tasks), and the organizations’ 
external environment (institutions, culture). Thus, ideally applied, studies of economic 
misconduct should take into account all these different factors. However, given data and 
modelling constraints such as an overall analysis might often not be feasible, at least not in a 
quantitative way. Thus, an economic incentive analysis might provide first insights that should 
then be complemented with taking into account non-economic factors in order to avoid deriving 
wrong policy conclusions (Bavorová et al., 2014; Hirschauer & Zwoll, 2008; Hirschauer et al., 
2012). 
 4.2 Criminological concepts 
The two most cited theories in the context of fraud analysis are the Fraud Triangle Theory (FTT) 
of Cressey from 1950 and the Fraud Diamond Theory (FDT) of Wolfe and Hermanson from 2004 
(Abdullahi & Mansor, 2015). Both of them identify the elements that lead perpetrators to commit 
fraud. According to the FTT, three elements are necessary for individuals to engage in fraudulent 
and unethical activities: (i) perceived pressure, (ii) perceived opportunity, and (iii) rationalisation. 
These three elements constitute the fraud triangle, which is illustrated in figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Fraud Triangle 
 
 
 
 
 
(Perceived) pressure refers to the factors that lead to unethical behaviour. Thus, this factor refers 
to the incentives or motives for committing the fraud. Since this pressure does not need to be 
real, it is also called perceived pressure. Consequently, different decision makers might perceive 
Fraud 
Pressure 
Opportunity Rationalisation 
Source: Own presentation 
 19 
the same objective pressure differently due to differences in their cognitive abilities and 
constraints. Furthermore, some studies differentiate between personal (individual financial or 
social pressure), employment (management derived pressure) and external (e.g. stakeholder 
pressure to give a financial return, social and political environment pressure) pressure (Manning 
et al., 2016). 
The second necessary element for fraud to occur is (perceived) opportunity. Opportunity is 
created by ineffective control or governance systems that allows an individual to commit fraud.20 
Perceived opportunity simply indicates that people will take advantage of circumstances 
available to them.  
Rationalisation is the third element of the FTT and refers to the fact that the perpetrator must 
formulate some justification for the criminal activity. Without finding excuses or justifications 
why their behaviour is acceptable, an individual will most likely not engage in fraud (Abdullahi & 
Mansor, 2015). Moral justification or advantageous comparisons are mechanisms that might be 
used to cognitively reframe unethical acts (Moore et al., 2012a). Moral justification cognitively 
reframes unethical acts as being in the service of a greater good, while advantageous comparison 
exploits the contrast between a behaviour under consideration and an even more reprehensible 
behaviour to make the former seem innocuous (Moore et al., 2012a). 
The Fraud Diamond Theory (FDT) is considered an extension of the FTT by adding a fourth 
element, namely capability. It has been argued that in order to commit a fraud, the 
individual/business must have the capability in terms of skills and ability to commit the fraud 
such as for example the ability to manipulate others (Dilla et al., 2013).  
Closely connected to these two concepts are the routine activity theory of Cohen and Felson 
(1979) and the situational prevention theory. The routine activity theory considers crime as the 
outcome of the convergence in time and place of motivated offenders, suitable targets and the 
absence of capable guardians. Situational prevention theory is concerned with understanding the 
circumstances of crime and in particular the availability of opportunities to commit crime using 
the principles of routine activity theory (Lord et al., 2017b).  
Several scholars pointed out that a routine activity approach seems particularly appropriate for 
the study of food fraud, since fraudulent activities are usually committed at the workplace and 
thus directly arise out of the routines of everyday life (e.g. Moyer et al., 2017; van Ruth et al., 
2017). Thus, food fraud is framed as a commercial enterprise crime involving legitimate food 
system actors and businesses who as part of their routine activities need to manage supply, 
demand, competitors and regulators to maintain enterprise (Lord et al., 2017b). In accordance 
with the routine activity theory and analogue to the fraud triangle, (food) fraud vulnerability can 
                                                            
20 In the field of accounting, this is termed as internal control weaknesses.  
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be defined by the three elements: opportunities, motivations and control measures. The 
opportunities point out why offenders are able to commit fraud and motivations detail why 
offenders would want to commit fraud (Coleman, 1987). The control measures in place may 
counteract the vulnerability resulting from opportunities and motivations. So applying the 
routine activity and situational prevention theories to food fraud implies analysing the 
circumstances and conditions that shape non-compliant behaviour and how to potentially 
intervene with these situations (Lord et al., 2017b). In this context, Lord et al. (2017b) proposed 
the following framework to analyse food fraud taking into account supply, demand, regulatory 
and competition factors:  
Figure 2: Conceptual model of determinants of fraudulent business activities 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own presentation based on Lord et al. (2017b) 
According to this framework, conditions relating to the nature of supply, demand, regulation 
and competition can create conducive environments and situations for food fraud to take 
place. Moreover, decisions and behavioural preferences are shaped by institutional cultures. 
Thus, the underlying idea is to approach food fraud by understanding the dynamics between 
individual actions, situational environments and wider structural drivers and pressures in order 
to be able to set up effective fraud prevention strategies.  
Besides, the Table of Eleven (T11) developed by the Dutch Ministry of Justice has already been 
briefly mentioned in section 3 as a tool to analyse non-compliance behaviour. The T11 consists of 
11 factors that are defined in table 2. 
  
Fraudulent Business 
Activities 
Demand  
 
Regulators 
Supply 
Competition 
 21 
Table 2: Dimensions and factors of the Table of Eleven  
No.  Dimension Definition 
Spontaneous compliance dimension 
T1 Knowledge of the 
regulation(s) 
The familiarity with and clarity of legislation among the target group 
T2 Cost/benefit 
considerations 
The tangible/intangible advantages and disadvantages arising from 
compliance or non-compliance with the regulation(s), expressed in 
time, money and effort as perceived by the target group (costs are not 
the fine paid in case of violation, this is incorporated in severity of 
sanction) 
T3 Extent of acceptance The extent to which the policy and legislation is considered acceptable 
by the target group 
T4 General law-adherence The extent to which the target group respects the authority resulting in 
willingness to comply 
T5 Non-official control The risk, as estimated by the target group, of positive or negative 
sanctions on their behaviour other than by the authorities  
Enforcement dimension 
T6 Risk of third part 
reporting 
The risk, as estimated by the target group, that a violation detected by 
others than the authorities, will be reported to a government body 
T7 Risk of inspection The risk, as estimated by the target group, of an inspection by the 
authorities as to whether rules are violated 
T8 Risk of detection The risk, as estimated by the target group, of a violation being detected 
in case an inspection is carried out by the authorities 
T9 Selectivity of inspection The perceived (increased) risk of inspection and detection of a violation 
resulting from the selection of businesses, persons, actions or areas to 
be inspected 
T10 Risk of sanction The risk, as estimated by the target group, of a sanction being imposed 
if an inspection detects a violation 
T11 Severity of sanction  The severity and nature of the sanction associated with the violation 
and additional disadvantages of being sanctioned as perceived by the 
target group 
Source: van Asselt et al. (2016) 
Five factors belong to the so-called spontaneous compliance dimension and reflect commitment 
or voluntary compliance, whereas six factors belong to the so-called enforcement dimension 
reflecting factors that are under the control of the law-enforcing agency (Elffers et al., 2003; van 
Asselt et al., 2016). Thus, in line with the results presented above, compliance behaviour does 
not only depend on external factors such as inspection frequency or likelihood of detection, but 
also on internal factors like the acceptance of the legislation and general law-adherence of 
individuals and businesses. Furthermore, factor T1 explicitly addresses the awareness and 
knowledge among the target group about a certain regulation. As stressed by Winter and May 
(2001), the willingness to comply is insufficient unless regulated entities are also aware of what 
is desired and are able to carry out the requisite steps. The T11 has been used in several analyses 
of the Dutch agri-food value chain such as Elffers et al. (2003) who analysed non-compliance 
among farmers with respect to the application of chemicals and van Asselt et al (2016) who 
simulated farmers’ compliance behaviour regarding antibiotics legislation. Moreover, the T11 is 
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used by inspection agencies in the Netherlands to analyse which inspection strategy would be 
most effective for improving compliance behaviour of target groups (van Asselt et al., 2016).  
4.3 Major lessons from the theoretical literature 
Even though economic misconduct in general and food fraud in particular has been approached 
by different disciplines, some stylised facts can be summarised. First, all approaches have a 
common denominator which is that misconduct is considered as a relevant behavioural option 
of economic actors. This misconduct, in turn, might cause risks for their business partners and 
other stakeholders such as consumers. Second, all frameworks analyse people’s choices as being 
motivated by a mix of economic and non-economic factors, embedded in a certain social and 
institutional environment. As a consequence, existing economic incentives are not considered as 
sufficient to explain food fraud, since individual and social norms and values may shield actors 
from committing misconduct despite existing monetary incentives. Therefore, apart from 
economic aspects, cognitive, social, cultural and institutional factors should ideally also be taken 
into account as important elements in the analysis of food fraud.  
4.4 Empirical case studies of analysing non-compliant behaviour in food supply 
chains 
In the following, three different case studies that relate to the analysis of food fraud and that rely 
on one of the theoretical concepts discussed above will be presented. The first and third case 
study focus on the economic incentive structure for economic misconduct in the German poultry 
and the Spanish olive oil supply chain, respectively. The second one analyses mislabelling of rice 
in Taiwan using the above introduced concept of institutional isomorphism theory (IIT).  
4.4.1 Case study 1: Economic incentive analysis for economic misconduct in the German 
poultry supply chain 
Hirschauer and Zwoll (2008) provided an analysis of the economic incentive structure for non-
compliance at different levels of the German poultry supply chain. They called this the first stage 
of research into economic misconduct, since they neither analysed actual behaviour nor qualified 
the actual choices contingent on the social settings and intrinsic motivations. Nevertheless, 
revealing economic temptations for non-compliance might help in assessing where problems 
might arise. 
For this purpose they carried out extensive interviews with members of the respective control 
fields and law enforcement authorities as well as producers, processors, consultants and interest 
groups. Based on the evidence from these interviews, different types of potential economic 
misconduct were identified and a formal incentive analysis was carried out for each. The features 
of the model proposed for the incentive analysis can be summarised as follows: 
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1. A binary perspective is adopted, meaning that the agent has only the choice between 
compliance versus non-compliance and there are only two expected outcomes (desired, 
undesired).  
2. q represents the probability of the desired outcome conditional on compliance, while r 
represents the probability of the undesired outcome conditional on non-compliance. 
Stochastic action-outcome linkages (equivalent to values q ≤ 100% and r ≤ 100%) exist, if a 
physical product quality is the relevant outcome. Whenever labelling issues such as region 
of origin or organic standards are considered, the linkage is deterministic and q and r can 
be equated to unity. 
3. Compliance causes compliance costs K, which usually comprise different components (e.g., 
increased input costs). 
4. Corresponding to the outcome, there are two payoffs. The payoff P, being paid for the 
desired outcome, and the payoff P-L being paid if the undesired outcome is disclosed. 
Losses from disclosure may result from various components such as losses in sales, damage 
compensation, fines, reputational losses (i.e. long-term market losses). 
5. Since inspections are costly, they can only be carried out randomly with an intensity s ≤ 100 
per cent (probability of random controls). In other words, an existing outcome irregularity 
is only identified with a detection probability s ≤ 100 per cent. 
6. Incentive problems resulting from incomplete output information may be aggravated in 
multiple-agent situations. A tracing coefficient z ≤ 100 per cent accounts for situations 
where an undesired outcome is observed at some (downstream) control point, but the 
responsible originator is only traced with a certain probability. Whenever the observed 
outcome can be directly attached to a single agent, the coefficient z can be set to unity. 
Thus, incentives to comply can be expressed as the difference between the expected payoff from 
compliance minus the expected payoff from non-compliance or more formally21:  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = [𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞𝑞)(𝑞𝑞 − 𝐿𝐿) − 𝐾𝐾] − ⌊(1 − 𝑟𝑟)𝑞𝑞 + 𝑟𝑟(𝑞𝑞 − 𝐿𝐿)⌋ = (𝑞𝑞 + 𝑟𝑟 − 1)𝐿𝐿 − 𝐾𝐾 (1) 
Whereby a negative result of (1) implies that the incentive structure fosters non-compliance, 
since the individual expects to earn higher profits through non-compliance than through 
compliance. A positive result, in contrast, means that it is more profitable to comply than not to 
comply. Equation 1 assumes complete inspection and tracing (i.e. if the outcome is observed it is 
unambiguously attached to the agent). However, in reality given the fact that controls are costly 
there will be no complete detection and thus, the expected pay-offs need to be adjusted. This is 
illustrated in equation 2 including the detection probability s and the tracing coefficient z:  
                                                            
21 For more details on the calculations, see Hirschauer and Zwoll (2008). 
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𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠 ∗ (𝑞𝑞 + 𝑟𝑟 − 1)𝐿𝐿 − 𝐾𝐾, 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ 0 < 𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠 ≤ 1     (2)22 
 
To illustrate the approach, two potential non-compliant activities and their respective incentive 
analysis are presented in the following table.  
Table 3: Economic incentive structure for non-compliance behaviour in the poultry supply chain 
 Use of conventional feed components in organic 
poultry feeding 
(Farm level) 
Marketing of 
conventional poultry 
as organic produce 
(Retail level) 
(a) Action-outcome linkages q and r   
Probability of desired outcome for compliance (q) 100 % 100 % 
Probability of undesired outcome for non-
compliance (r) 
100 % 100 % 
(b) Detection probability s   
Probability that an undesired outcome is detected 3 % 6 % 
(c) Compliance costs K (€)   
Costs arising from compliance with the rules 900 202 
(d) Losses L (€)   
Inflicted losses if non-compliance is proven 
thereof: 
69,004 1,000 
Short term losses (from sales) 44,064 0 
Short-term sanctions (fines, subsidy losses) 24,940 1,000 
Disposal costs 0 0 
Capitalized long-term market losses 0 0 
(e) Tracing coefficient z   
The responsible actor’s probability of being traced 100 % 100  % 
Economic inferiority (-)/superiority(+) of 
compliance 
1,170a -142a 
Ceteris paribus critical level of the inflicted loss (€) 30,000 3,367 
Ceteris paribus critical detection probability  1.3 % 20.2 % 
Notes: a These numbers are the central outcome of the analysis indicating that non-compliance is either favourable 
(negative sign) or unfavourable (positive sign). 
According to the experts’ assessment, the use of conventional feed for organic poultry is not 
considered a profitable misconduct option, as can be seen in the positive superiority of 
compliance. This result is mainly driven by significant sales losses, since in case of detection the 
farmer would have to sell his poultry as lower-priced conventional poultry. Representing a 
serious loss, the detection probability could even fall from the assumed level of 3 per cent to a 
level of 1.3 per cent without jeopardising the incentive compatibility (last row in the table). In 
contrast, selling conventional poultry as organic at the retail/butcher level is assessed as offering 
                                                            
22 Even though the model contains only few parameters, in empirical applications a major challenge is to identify 
these components and realistically estimate their values or, at least, magnitudes.  
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economic incentives for non-compliance. The results seem mainly to be driven by the overall low 
detection probabilities that shape the incentive structure towards non-compliance. In the 
interviews with the experts from the control field (public authorities), low inspection intensities 
were often justified (besides budgetary constraints) by the general trustworthiness of most food 
business operators. 
4.4.2 Case study 2: Analysing mislabelling of rice in Taiwan, using the institutional 
isomorphism theory (IIT) 
Liu (2016) investigated mislabelling of rice in Taiwan by drawing on the institutional isomorphism 
theory (IIT). The Taiwanese rice industry was chosen as a case study since it has been estimated 
that the proportion of firms mislabelling their products has been constantly fluctuating between 
10 and 20 per cent. The leading manufacturer of packaged rice in Taiwan was in August 2013, 
found to have deceived consumers by using inferior rice from Vietnam as a substitute for quality 
rice from Taiwan in its renowned Sunsuivi Long Grain Rice. Furthermore, in September of the 
same year, the Agriculture and Food Agency found that 18 per cent of the products inspected, 
which were produced by the three major grain dealers, were mislabelled. 
A major reason for the incentive to mislabel rice in Taiwan seems to be the governmental policy 
of acquiring public grain reserves (i.e. the Taiwanese government purchases rice at a guaranteed 
price each year to build public grain reserves). This guaranteed price drives up the domestic price 
of Taiwanese rice, causing it to be higher than for rice from other main supply areas such as 
Thailand, Vietnam, or China. Thus, this price gap between domestic and imported rice led some 
companies to choose to mix imported rice with local rice and then sell the packaged rice as local 
rice. Besides, from a regulatory point of view, non-compliant businesses were simply asked to 
make improvements themselves by a certain deadline without imposing any penalties for non-
compliant behaviour.  
The empirical analysis had its focus on the period 2008 to 2014, and analysed the causality 
between these institutional factors and the level of mislabelling. The results of this longitudinal 
analysis showed that the evolutionary processes behind regulatory control, public attention, and 
the level of mislabelling are self-reinforcing, i.e., the former statuses of these institutional factors 
accelerate their future statuses. Furthermore, the degree of mislabelling is not only affected by 
former levels of regulatory control, public attention and mislabelling, but also modifies the future 
status of each of these.  
In terms of practical implications, the authors conclude the following from their findings: First, 
regulatory control only remains strong if the level of mislabelling is low, and so in addition to 
increasing the fine, regulators should also endeavour to monitor such activities more effectively 
through periodic large-scale inspections of food products. Second, the results suggest that high 
levels of public attention could lower the degree of mislabelling. Thus, it is important for 
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consumers’ associations to play an aggressive role in educating consumers or by revising 
regulations on an ongoing basis in response to consumers’ concerns. Third, a high former level 
of mislabelling could enhance the future status of mislabelling, which might result in a decrease 
of the average quality of food in the market23. Consequently, although a firm that mislabels its 
products may receive more profit in the short term, a higher level of mislabelling within the 
industry will reduce their profit in the long term. Such behaviour might be counteracted by 
pointing out that ethical business behaviour pays off in the long run, and thus firms should aim 
to become ethical benchmarks. 
4.4.3 Case study 3: Analysis of adulteration and fraud in the Spanish olive oil market24  
Following the conceptual framework presented in figure 2, Lord et al. (2017b) analysed the 
incentive structure for fraudulent activities in the Spanish olive oil market. Documented cases of 
food fraud in the Spanish olive oil market comprise among others, the disguise of sunflower, 
avocado or palm oil as olive oil, using preservatives and colorants.  
In a first step, a chart of the Spanish olive oil production based on interviews with industry actors 
was set up to understand how different stakeholders/businesses in the Spanish olive oil supply 
chain operate, interact and make their profit. Additionally, aggregate data relating to production, 
consumption, imports, exports, market shares and data on price volatility were collected. 
According to these data, the Spanish olive oil market can be considered a very complex one (see 
annex 1), with at the same time few powerful market actors and cartel-like private organisations 
that appear to control the price of oil. Moreover, the authors identified three significant changes 
in the production and supply arrangements of olive oil in Spain after the financial crisis in 2007: 
(i) the growth of second degree cooperatives, (ii) changes to the distribution strategies of large 
cooperatives and (iii) the increase in retailers’ own brands. The increase in retailers’ own brands 
concentrated demand, which resulted in fierce price competition that reduced supply chain profit 
margins. Furthermore, as a consequence of the price volatility during the post-financial crisis, 
olive oil bottlers and refineries established companies in third countries on the Mediterranean 
coast in order to diversify supply.  
An overview of the identified relevant supply, demand, regulatory and external environmental 
drivers in the Spanish olive oil market is presented in table 4.  
  
                                                            
23 This result, when bad quality pushes good quality from the market because of an information gap or asymmetric 
information between buyer and seller, is also known as “adverse selection” (Akerlof, 1970). 
24 This whole section is based on Lord et al. (2017b). The authors focused on adulteration rather than on other fraud 
types such as mislabelling or misdescription, or forms of tax and subsidies frauds, although the authors point out 
that there is often overlap between these fraud types.  
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Table 4: Current drivers in the Spanish olive oil market 
Factor  Current drivers 
Supply • Concentration of supply by which the bottling of olive oil has 
become more expensive.  
• Production exceeds consumption creating a state of perpetual 
oversupply for domestic markets.  
• Mills must operate at ‘optimum capacity’ to be viable which creates 
surplus.  
Demand • Price volatilities when buying in supply. This leads to confrontation 
between the traditional industry (bottling and refining) and 
producers (growers and mills). The power shift to distributor’s own 
brands has confronted industry (bottling and refining) to 
distributors at the consumer-end. 
Regulation • Lack of credible regulatory oversight and capable guardianship (a 
necessary but not sufficient condition).  
• Business and institutional cultures make prohibited conduct 
acceptable.  
Competition • Product is stored by dominant cooperatives (essentially cartels 
under EU law) and released as prices climb to maximise profit, 
which creates pressure for competitors. 
• Increases in own brand products, which have led to the 
concentration of demand, pressures on prices and a reduction on 
the margins of the whole supply chain due to war prices. Retailers 
are selling olive oil at a loss to attract clients. 
• Taking a loss has significant financial impact (false profits/losses) - 
criminal necessity as a consequence of market practices in order to 
maintain cash flow. 
Source: Lord et al. (2017b) 
Based on this analysis, the authors conclude that adulteration and illegal blending is unlikely to 
occur at the production stage of olives but rather at the processing stage. More specifically, it is 
likely to take place between post-extraction and pre-packaging. Thus, in order to prevent such 
types of adulteration and illegal blending, potential situational prevention mechanisms might be 
the increase of the level of non-routine inspection measures in key locations such as mills and 
refineries. Further prevention mechanisms might be the improvement of due diligence 25 of 
suppliers of anomalous products such as a producer of colorants or other untypical ingredients 
in oil, and a whistleblowing protection system as a tool to increase the risk of detection. 
Montanari et al. (2016) pointed out that most of the food fraud cases that are detected are 
denounced by subjects acting in the supply chain.  
 
                                                            
25  Due diligence refers to the care a reasonable person should take before entering into an agreement or a 
financial transaction with another party (https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/duediligence.asp). 
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5 Existing prevention, detection and mitigation tools  
The last section ended with some examples on how an (economic) food fraud incentive 
assessment could look like. The following section will focus in more depth on existing prevention 
tools. For this purpose, an overview of existing databases and meta-analyses of food fraud will 
be provided, followed by a section elaborating which kind of food fraud prevention tools/models 
currently exist. Since the report focuses solely on social science approaches, laboratory detection 
methods will not be covered. 
5.1 Databases and meta-analyses – extent and patterns of food fraud 
Several efforts are ongoing to compile and capture current and historical data on food fraud 
incidents through the creation of databases and repositories (Johnson, 2014). More specifically, 
the idea is to create a repository of information that consolidates all relevant historical 
information to include ingredient, adulterant, source, date of incidence, cost to the firm and 
actions taken. Thus, these databases and repositories are considered useful tools to identify 
illegitimate practices applied previously to specific raw materials or food products (retrospective 
analysis), which in turn might help to identify trends and thus potentially prevent future food 
fraud incidents (prospective analysis) (Cavin et al., 2016; Moore et al., 2012b).  
Table 5 provides an overview of existing databases, repositories and meta-analyses of food fraud 
incidents.  
Table 5: Existing databases, repositories and scientific meta-analyses 
Category  Provided by Source of 
information 
Geographical 
coverage 
Databases 
USP’s Food Fraud Database 2.0 
http://www.foodfraud.org/#/food-
fraud-database-version-20 
The United States 
Pharmacopeial 
Convention  
Scholarly & media 
reports 
Global 
Food Adulteration Incidents Registry 
(FAIR) 
https://foodprotection.umn.edu/fair  
Food Protection and 
Defense Institute (FDPI) 
at the University of 
Minnesota 
Publicly available 
sources 
Global 
FPDI Economically Motivated 
Adulteration (EMA) Susceptibility 
Database 
https://www.foodshield.org./discover-
tools-links/tools/ 
Food Protection and 
Defense Institute at the 
University of Minnesota 
   
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
(RASFF) database 
The European 
Commission 
Alerts/notifications 
by member states 
or third-part 
countries 
EU/Global 
(Cont.) 
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Category  Provided by Source of 
information 
Geographical 
coverage 
Meta-analyses 
Media analysis of reported food 
fraud incidents (N=1553) 
Zhang & Xue (2016)  China 
Analyses of seafood mislabelling 
(N=51) 
Pardo et al. (2016) Scientific reports 
published in the last 
5 years 
Globally 
Others 
JRC’s Food fraud Alerts Joint research Centre of 
the European Commission 
Media reports/ 
RASFF 
EU/Global 
Source: Own compilation 
The United States Pharmacopeial Convention (USP) Food Fraud database 2.0 is a database that 
catalogues available analytical methods to detect and identify problematic food ingredients, 
which in turn provides a repository for ingredient fraud reports. The database is organised by 
food ingredient categories and identifies the type of adulterant reported for each documented 
record.  
The Food Protection and Defense Institute’s Food Adulteration Incidents Registry (FAIR) is a 
compilation of historical and current events involving economically motivated and intentional 
adulteration of foods on a global scale. Data is routinely curated from publicly available sources 
and includes food adulteration incidents motivated by terrorism, sabotage, and fraudulent 
economic gain. 
The FPDI EMA Incident Database catalogues and details a wide range of unique incidents of EMA 
in 16 different categories. The database is searchable by incident characteristics such as food 
adulterant, production location, morbidity/mortality, and date. 
The RASFF database enables information to be shared rapidly and efficiently between the 
European Commission, food and feed control authorities in Member States and organizations 
whenever a health risk has been identified. All 27 EU Member States are members of RASFF, 
together with the European Commission and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway are also full members of RASFF26.  
Besides, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission publishes monthly Food 
Fraud Alerts. These are monthly summaries of articles on food fraud and adulteration, with the 
objective of informing stakeholders of potential fraud cases in the global feed/food chain, giving 
them the opportunity to take action to counter fraud. The types of foods being searched for are 
those on the list of commodities, that are often subject to fraud as defined by the EU Parliament 
in its resolution of 14 January 2014 on the food crisis, fraud in the food chain and the control 
                                                            
26 https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/safety/docs/rasff_leaflet_en.pdf  
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thereof: olive oil, fish, organic products, grains, honey, coffee, tea, spices, wine, certain fruit 
juices, milk and meat. 
Extent and patterns of food fraud 
Moore et al. (2012b) and Johnson (2014) summarised data from the USP Food Fraud Database 
and reported that oils, milk, juices, spices, and sweeteners account for 69 per cent of the reported 
cases between the years 1980 and 2010, while natural flavours, spices, seafood, and 
grains/cereals headed the list of food ingredient fraudulent cases. Overall, olive oil, milk, honey, 
and saffron were the most common targets for adulteration reported in scholarly journals, and 
potentially harmful issues identified include spices diluted with lead chromate, substitution of 
Chinese star anise with toxic Japanese star anise, and melamine adulteration of high protein 
content foods. Based on a media analysis for China, Zhang and Xue (2016) reported that animal 
foods, processed foods or mixed foods, drinks and beverages, as well as cooking oils were most 
prone to fraudulent activities. Pardo et al. (2016) focused on mislabelling of seafood and showed 
that in their sample, on average 30 per cent of controlled products were mislabelled. Incidents 
in restaurants and takeaways seem to be much more common than in supermarkets and 
retailers. In addition, they stressed that the available data indicates a remarkable absence of 
appropriate sampling plans prior to sample collection. 
Moore et al. (2012b) also analysed the data in terms of the type of fraud detected. The USP 
database classifies food fraud into three categories: replacement, addition, and removal. The 
term replacement refers to cases where authentic material is replaced with another, less 
expensive, substitute without the purchaser’s knowledge and for the seller’s economic gain. 
Substitution of dairy fat with palm oil in cheese production is an example of this type of fraud. 
Addition refers to the addition of non-authentic substance to mask inferior quality ingredient 
without the purchasers’ knowledge, whereas removal refers to the removal of an authentic and 
valuable constituent without the purchasers’ knowledge, respectively (Moore et al., 2012b). The 
replacement category represented 95 per cent of the records in the database, followed by less 
than 5 per cent for addition and less than 1 per cent for removal. 
Tähkäpää et al. (2015) analysed the overall pattern of reported frauds and adulterations for the 
period 2008-2012 based on RASSF notifications. Besides, notifications published by the Finnish 
Food Safety Authority (Evira) and local Finnish cases were analysed. According to this study, the 
share of frauds and adulterations in total notifications and recalls is very low at the EU level (2 
per cent out of all RASFF notifications) and relatively low at the national (21 per cent of Evira 
notifications) and local level (only 16 cases detected) in Finland.  
Most frauds were detected via border controls and the most common response from control 
authorities to non-compliance with regulation according to RASFF notifications was the 
destruction or re-dispatching of the product. Actions were most commonly taken for seafood, 
food from farm animals and cereals, nuts, bakery products and confectionery. This might be 
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due, at least partially, to the quantity of these products imported to the EU, since seafood was 
the second most common product imported to the EU. With respect to the origin, the data shows 
that only in 8 per cent of reported fraud and adulteration cases the food originated in the EU. 
This might indicate that frauds and adulterations mainly occur for foods produced outside the 
EU. However, it might also indicate that the RASFF system is tailored especially to report non-EU 
cases of frauds or adulterations, and that cases possibly occurring more commonly in the EU are 
simply missed by the RASFF system.  
This latter aspect is quite important to have in mind while interpreting databases on food fraud 
in general. It has been pointed out by several scholars that the existing databases may be more 
representative of foods that are the most researched, and not necessarily foods that are the most 
adulterated (e.g. Johnson, 2014).  
5.2 Food fraud prevention tools and models  
Several research projects are under way, exploring the possibilities to forecast and thus prevent 
future fraud incidents. The following section will provide a review of this ongoing research and 
outline the major models and concepts developed so far. Table 6 provides a list of currently 
available models of food fraud prevention with their underlying theoretical framework, if 
available.   
Table 6: Existing food fraud prevention models 
Name of the concept/model Developed by Theoretical framework 
Specific food fraud models 
Bayesian Network model to 
predict food fraud type 
Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016); 
Marvin et al. (2016) 
Bayesian Network (BN) approach  
Early Warning system for 
identification of potential health 
risks and fraudulent practices in 
the food sector. 
Bavarian Health and Food Safety 
Authority (LGL), Müller et al. 
(2015) 
Horizon Scanning & Root Cause 
Analysisa  
Food Fraud Initial Screening model 
(FFIS) 
Spink et al. (2016a) Enterprise risk management (ERM) 
framework 
Food Fraud Vulnerability 
Assessment  
Cavin et al. (2016), Silvis et al. 
(2017), Wu et al. (2017) 
 
Food Fraud Vulnerability Concept van Ruth et al (2017), van Ruth et 
al. (2018) 
Routine activity theory 
NSF Fraud Protection Model NSF (Safety and Quality UK Ltd) 
(2014) 
Fraud Triangle 
Product-counterfeiting incident 
cluster tool 
Spink et al. (2013) Routine Activity Theory and 
Situational Crime Prevention 
Threat Assessment  National Food Crime Unit (2016) - 
(Cont.) 
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Name of the concept/model Developed by Theoretical framework 
General food value chain/food system models 
TRANSMANGO vulnerability 
matrix 
Grando et al. (2016)  
Qualitative food system 
vulnerability matrix 
Paloviita et al. (2016) Systems approach 
Notes: a Horizon scanning refers to public consultations with experts and stakeholders to identify future risks and 
prioritise them, in order to develop mitigation measures before problems occur. 
Source: Own compilation, in alphabetical order.  
Bouzembrak and Marvin (2016) developed a Bayesian Network (BN)27 model in order to predict 
the expected food fraud type for imported products for which the product category and 
country of origin are known. This model is based on fraud notifications reported in the RASFF 
database in the period 2000-2013. The developed BN model predicted 80 per cent of food fraud 
types when food fraud type, country of origin and food category had been reported in RASFF 
earlier. The model gave the correct prediction in 52 per cent of the cases, when a country or 
country-food category combination appeared that had not been reported in the RASFF database 
earlier. The developed BN model cannot predict food fraud itself but showed good 
performance in predicting the type of fraud that is reported in RASFF, based on product 
category and country of origin as input values.  
Marvin et al. (2016) developed this BN model further28. Besides data from the RASFF, they 
integrated data from the existing literature, other food fraud databases (EMA, 2014) and food 
fraud expert interviews. Based on these different data sources, the following drivers of food fraud 
were identified: prices of the fraudulent product at the time of detection, trade volumes of the 
product between the country of detection and the country of origin (COO), price spikes of the 
fraudulent product around the period of fraud detection, characteristics of the COO and of the 
country that detected the incident, such as indices for perceived corruption, food safety, 
governance, legal system, the press, human development and technology. Based on the 
developed BN model, the variables COO and product were identified as having the greatest 
influence on the type of food fraud, followed by notifying country, year, press index of the COO, 
and the corruption perception index (CPI) of the notifying country.  
The proposed NSF Fraud Protection Model is based on the fraud triangle and takes into account 
potential profit and likelihood of detection while opportunity is currently not included (NSF, 
2014). This model is supposed to deliver a working framework by which food businesses or 
regulatory bodies can begin to better anticipate which product lines are most/least likely to be 
                                                            
27 BNs are a class of probabilistic models originating from the Bayesian statistics and decision theory combined with 
graph theory, which are able to model dependencies between variables, manage non-linear interactions and 
integrate different kinds of information such as expert knowledge or measurement data (Ben-Gal, 2007). 
28 The authors use food fraud as an example but point out that the developed model can also be of use to model 
other aspects of FSCs. 
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targeted by fraudsters. For this purpose, a 4-quadrant Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix 
style framework was developed with the intention to provide a clear visual representation of 
relative product risk. Depending on the potential profit opportunities and the likelihood of 
detection, different ingredient categories are assessed for their food fraud risk. Such a risk 
assessment is illustrated in figure 3.  
Figure 3: Risk assessment of different ingredient categories according to the NSF draft fraud 
model 
 
Source: NSF (2014), p.32 
According to this assessment, the product categories of eggs, herbs and sauces are plotted in the 
top right quadrant, which is the most desirable scenario for a fraudster (high profit, low likelihood 
of detection). It has been pointed out that the developed model focuses on organised food crime 
and is probably less useful where the fraudulent activity takes place for other reasons, such as 
for example to meet unforeseen shortfall of supply. 
Several studies are available that aim at developing and applying a food fraud vulnerability 
assessment (FFVA) tool (Cavin et al., 2016; Silvis et al., 2017; van Ruth et al., 2017, van Ruth et 
al., 2018; Wu et al., 2017). These concepts rely on or build upon the analytical frameworks 
presented in section 4, particularly the Routine Activity Theory and Situational Crime Prevention. 
To recall, the underlying idea is that in order to prevent food fraud it is important to understand 
existing vulnerabilities in FSCs, since these weaknesses provide opportunities for fraud. Section 
4 already introduced the framework proposed by Lord et al. (2017b). A closely related framework 
by van Ruth et al. (2017) is illustrated in the following figure. 
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Figure 4: Food fraud vulnerability concept 
 
Source: van Ruth et al. (2017) 
These authors classified opportunities into technical opportunities and opportunities in time and 
space. Technical opportunities refer to the ease of adulteration/counterfeiting of certain types 
of products and the general availability of knowledge and technology to adulterate in a particular 
FSC. Opportunities in time and space refer to the organization of the FSC whereby it is assumed, 
for example, that fraud opportunities increase when the offender is spatially separated from the 
victim. Thus, an increasingly complexity of an FSC will enhance the fraud vulnerability (see case 
study 3 on the Spanish olive oil supply chain and its complexity, presented in Annex 1). With 
respect to motivational drivers, one might differentiate between economic and non-economic 
ones, whereas regarding control measure one might distinguish between technical and 
managerial measures. Overall, more opportunities and motivations increase the fraud 
vulnerability, whereas control measures can act as countermeasures and decrease these 
vulnerabilities (Silvis et al., 2017).  
A slightly different classification of factors that determine vulnerabilities in FSCs has been 
proposed by Cavin et al. (2016) and Wu et al. (2017). These authors differentiate between 
vulnerabilities due to (i) factors inherent to the raw material, (ii) factors impacting the business 
(Business Pressure), and (iii) factors under the control of the buyer.  
Vulnerabilities driven by factors inherent to the raw material depend mainly on the physical 
state of the raw material, its level of processing and its composition. Some raw materials are by 
nature more vulnerable to adulteration than others. Milk is discussed as one example of a 
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product that has been highly adulterated worldwide for many years. Its physical state as a liquid 
makes it easy to adulterate by addition of many adulterants such as water or using milk from 
foreign species. Moreover, the raw milk price depends on its composition such as protein and fat 
levels and its microbiological quality. These factors have a strong impact on the milk’s inherent 
vulnerability to adulteration since many compounds with very different properties can be added 
to make profit from milk. Thus, it is concluded that the fraud history of a certain 
ingredient/product (past cases of adulteration of specific raw materials) is a good source of 
information to assess the raw materials’ potential vulnerability (Wu et al., 2017). 
Vulnerabilities driven by factors impacting the business refer mainly to factors such as the 
demand for a specific raw material (volume), its extent of use (meaning possible application in 
several finished products and different businesses) or significant market price fluctuations. Any 
anomaly in the economics of a particular raw material source, such as a drastic price increase or 
a country-specific low price compared to the rest of the world, might be potential indicators of 
increased raw material vulnerability due to economic conditions (Wu et al., 2017).  
Vulnerabilities driven by factors under the control of the buyer refer to the strength or the 
weakness of a company’s food fraud mitigation strategy. This comprises for example 
implemented traceability systems, adequate purchasing specifications, availability of analytical 
methods, and robustness of surveillance programs (Cavin et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2017). 
Even though different studies have proposed different categorisations of factors determining 
vulnerabilities, it is important to point out that all studies address more or less the same set of 
factors in order to analyse vulnerabilities of FSCs.  
A freely available FFVA tool, taking into account the different dimensions and determinants 
described above, is available on the SSAFE website (http://www.ssafe-food.org/our-projects/#). 
The explicitly stated goal of this tool is to help any food business, irrespective of size or 
geographic location, to assess their vulnerability to fraudulent activities and prepare mitigation 
plans. The SSAFE food fraud vulnerability self-assessment is based on 50 questions and answering 
grids related to the above discussed vulnerability factors. More specifically, 11 questions relate 
to opportunities, 20 to motivations and 19 to control measures (van Ruth et al., 2017). Annex 2 
provides a detailed table with the included questions and potential answers. The practical 
application of this tool is illustrated in two case studies presented below (5.2.1 and 5.2.2). 
A vulnerability assessment, however, is only a first step in setting up a business or governmental 
food fraud prevention strategy. Such an assessment needs to be complemented with mitigation 
measures to decrease the likelihood of fraudulent activities. Hence, a complete food fraud 
management system, analogue to any other risk management system should be implemented, 
and several companies have already implemented such a system. Nestlé for example, published 
a booklet on food fraud prevention with the purpose to provide guidance to food operators on 
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how to assure the authenticity of food by minimising vulnerability to fraud and mitigating the 
consequences of food fraud (Nestlé, 2016). With regard to a food fraud management system it is 
argued that food fraud should simply be handled and managed as any other business risk, 
involving the assessment of the risk (or vulnerability in this case), followed by setting up, 
reviewing and implementing appropriate mitigation strategies. Furthermore, given the fact that 
vulnerabilities might change over time, this process needs to be repeated either periodically or 
in case significant changes occur (e.g. price anomalies, supply shortage of raw materials). 
Potential mitigation measures a company can take include among others: strict raw material 
monitoring (e.g. setting up of specification and surveillance measures to ensure authenticity) and 
tight relationships with suppliers (“know where your raw materials are coming from”) in order to 
increase transparency and traceability in the supply chain.  
For the sake of completeness, table 6 also lists models specifically designed for assessing food 
system vulnerability in general. These are the TRANSMANGO vulnerability matrix and the 
Qualitative food system vulnerability matrix. Both models aim at obtaining a comprehensive 
picture of the effects of the global drivers of change on European and global food demand and 
on raw material production. Thus, they focus on the vulnerability and resilience of European food 
systems in a context of socio-economic, behavioural, technological, institutional and agro-
ecological change and aim to enhance understanding of the new challenges and opportunities 
that the food sector will face in the future.  
5.2.1  Case study 4: Vulnerability assessment in the spices supply chain 
Silvis et al. (2017) applied the SSAFE FFVA tool described above and presented in detail in annex 
2 in order to assess the fraud vulnerabilities of various actors in the spices supply chain. Spices 
were chosen because they are frequently reported to be adulterated. Eight companies, all 
members of the European Spices Association (ESA), participated in the study: a trader, two 
importers, two business-to-business companies, and three business-to-business/business-to-
consumer enterprises. 
The results of the FFVA are illustrated in the following spider web diagrams (figure 5.) 
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Figure 5: Spider web diagrams of opportunities, motivations, and control measures 
 
Note: Spider web diagrams for opportunities (indicator 1-11), motivations (indicator 12-31), and control measures 
(indicator 32-50) for scores with highest frequencies (continuous line). Numbers in black refer to the 50 questions 
of the tool (see annex 2) and numbers in grey refer to low, medium and high vulnerability situations. For 
opportunities and motivations a score of 1, 2, 3 refers to low, medium and high vulnerability, respectively. For control 
measures the order is reversed.  
Source: Silvis et al. (2017) 
According to the assessment, the ease of adulterating spices combined with the complexity of 
fraud detection (indicators 1 to 5) creates considerable opportunities to commit fraud (high 
vulnerability). Thus, one of the reasons why companies buy spices from their suppliers in their 
whole form (not milled) is because they wish to ensure that the material is free from adulterants. 
Opportunities associated with supply chain transparency and fraudulent incidents in the past 
were judged as medium vulnerable. Strong competition (indicator 30) and the high added value 
of spices (indicator 12) are perceived as important economic drivers to commit fraud (high 
vulnerability). In contrast, cultural and behavioural factors such as ethical business culture 
(indicators 16, 21, 22, 28) were considered to contribute less to the actual fraud vulnerability. 
With respect to control measures, the results indicate that many of the indicators such as Fraud 
control industry, Specificity national food policy and Law enforcement chain network (indicators 
46-49) scored 1, indicating a high vulnerability. The authors elaborate further that most 
interviewees perceived that laws and policies that address particular fraud issues are not actively 
enforced in their country. 
5.2.2 Case study 5: (Dis)similarities in fraud vulnerability across supply chains  
Van Ruth et al. (2018) aimed at providing insights on the (dis)similarities in fraud vulnerability 
across supply chains and actor groups, which might help to combat future food fraud. For this 
purpose, they assessed the fish, meat, milk, olive oil, organic bananas, and spice supply chains 
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for their fraud vulnerabilities, using the SSAFE FFFVA tool.29 The analysed stakeholder groups 
included wholesalers, processors, and retailers.  
Overall, some drivers were assigned high scores (high vulnerability) across all different supply 
chains. These drivers are: available technology and knowledge about adulterating raw 
materials/final products, fraud detectability in raw materials/final products, historical evidence 
of fraud in raw materials/final products, supply and pricing of raw materials, valuable 
components or attributes of raw materials, the corruption level in the supplier country, economic 
conditions and the level of competition in the industry, and price asymmetries. In contrast, the 
results indicate that control measures varied considerably across supply chains and actor groups, 
with technical controls generally being more in place than managerial controls. Managerial 
controls in a wider sense, i.e. social control and food policy and enforcement, were perceived as 
lacking or insufficient in many cases. Moreover, fraud vulnerability appeared highest for the spice 
chain, which was followed by the olive oil, meat, fish, milk and organic banana chains. Among the 
actor groups, the wholesale/traders group appeared most vulnerable, followed by retailers and 
processors. 
  
                                                            
29 These supply chains were chosen because most detected food fraud cases were found for these products (see 
section 5.1.). 
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6 Discussion and conclusions 
The present report aimed at reviewing the theoretical as well as the empirical literature on food 
fraud, in order to provide a solid knowledge base for further discussions among policy makers, 
regulatory bodies, private businesses and scientists on how to approach fraudulent activities in 
food supply chains.  
Overall, economic and criminological concepts related to the prevention and detection of 
regulatory misconduct are highly relevant for addressing food fraud. More specifically, the 
routine activity theory and the economics of crime approach are important frameworks to 
consider, while setting up cost-effective prevention and detection strategies. In this line, it has 
been pointed out, that food fraud might be addressed and analysed, as any other business 
decision, taking into account the incentive structure for regulatory compliance versus non-
compliance. 
Moreover, companies and regulatory agencies should address food fraud as any other food risk 
via a risk-based approach. In the context of food fraud, the term vulnerability is often used 
instead of risk and thus a vulnerability (risk) assessment should be a first important step in setting 
up prevention strategies. Based on this vulnerability assessment, mitigation strategies to reduce 
these vulnerabilities need to be designed and implemented in order to decrease the likelihood 
of fraud. Thus, a food fraud management system should be considered as an integral part of a 
company’s overall risk management system.  
The existing literature has pointed out several important micro- and macro-level factors that 
seem to primarily determine vulnerabilities in FSCs. These are the ease and detection of 
adulteration, the presence of added value claims, such as organic or PDO/PGI labels, demand 
exceeding supply, and the complexity of the value chain (low transparency increases 
vulnerability).  
Additionally, existing empirical evidence indicates that existing legal enforcement powers were 
not used to their full extent and control officials' orders would be more effective if the sanctions 
for disobeying were rapid and sufficiently severe. In this context, it has been argued that fines 
are only one element of a food fraud fighting strategy, which should also include other elements 
such as the withdrawal of licenses and authorisations, as well as naming and shaming-
techniques, and human capacity building measures (Bavorová et al., 2014). 
Moreover, it has been pointed out that consumers are important actors in food fraud detection 
since they can be viewed as auditors in food markets, contributing to horizontal scanning and 
intelligence sharing (Wang et al., 2017). Dabbene et al (2014) for example pointed out that 
consumers can and should be involved and become part of traceability systems in order to 
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increase and broaden the monitoring activities of suspicious transactions. Thus, consumers 
should not only be considered as the ones negatively affected by food fraud but also as important 
stakeholders to detect and prevent food fraud.  
Consequently, the report recommends the following points: 
First, since resources for inspections and analytical investigations are limited, a vulnerability risk-
based approach should be the guiding principle to set-up governmental control and inspection 
plans. There have been several first studies investigating vulnerabilities across different supply 
chains and stakeholder groups highlighting determinants of fraudulent activities. These studies 
should build the basis for ongoing empirical research providing ground for risk- (vulnerability)-
based control and governance approaches in terms of cost-effective sampling and control 
schemes.  
Second, since food fraud is a complex and multifaceted topic that can and should be addressed 
by different scientific disciplines, a potential working group on food fraud need to take this 
complexity into account. Put differently, natural scientists with knowledge about up-to-date 
analytical techniques to detect fraud need to work closely together with scientists coming from 
social sciences, such as economics, sociology or criminology, to set up appropriate prevention 
strategies. This is true both for the governmental as well as for the business level.  
Third, each stakeholder group in food supply chains should consider food fraud as any other 
business risk and thus address it within their risk management system. Such a business 
behaviour might be fostered by a governmental information campaign, pointing out the 
importance of an appropriate food fraud management system and potentially providing a 
guidance document on the issue similar to the booklet provided by Nestlé (2016). Furthermore, 
a governmental information campaign highlighting the different forms of food fraud, and whom 
to contact in case consumers detect signs of fraudulent activities, might enable consumers to 
actively take part in an overall food fraud prevention strategy.  
Fourth, traceability plays a central role in ensuring authentic food products. Thus, possibilities 
to foster traceability and increase food integrity should be prioritised both by businesses as well 
as by governmental agencies. Since private standards are playing an increasing role in the 
governance of agricultural and food supply chains (e.g. GLOBALG.A.P.), public-private 
partnerships to tackle food fraud as one of several food risks supply chain actors face seem to 
be a very promising approach.   
Fifth, scientifically grounded cost-benefit analyses are needed to avoid costly overregulation. 
As is the case for other (food) risks, setting up prevention strategies are costly and thus cost-
benefits analyses are necessary to guide governmental agencies. This is especially important with 
regard to stakeholder acceptance of regulations governing food fraud. As was highlighted in the 
 41 
Table of Eleven, stakeholder awareness and acceptance of a certain regulation are central to a 
successful implementation.  
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Annex 1. Flow chart of the olive oil production chain 
 
 
Source: Lord et al. (2017b) 
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Annex 2: Questionnaire with answer grids of the SSAFE FFVA tool 
# Question Reason for Asking the 
Question 
Answer option 1 Answer option 2 Answer option 3 
1 Is it simple or 
complex to 
adulterate your 
raw materials? 
Easy alteration of the 
composition of the raw 
materials provides 
opportunities for potential 
offenders to commit fraud 
• Composition of the 
materials cannot be 
modified and products can 
only be replaced, i.e. it 
concerns large objects such 
as fruit 
• Composition of the raw 
materials can be modified by 
mixing with low-quality 
product-own material or 
foreign material, i.e. as is 
feasible with ground products 
(e.g. powders, ground beef, 
etc.) 
• Composition of the raw materials 
can be modified by mixing with low-
quality or foreign material (e.g. 
powders, ground meat, etc.) and by 
altering valuable food components 
(e.g. protein content) 
2 Is the technology 
and knowledge to 
adulterate  your 
raw materials 
generally 
available? 
Technology, methods and 
knowledge to 
adulterate/modify a 
certain type of raw 
materials provides 
opportunities for potential 
offenders to commit fraud 
• Technologies and/or 
methods to adulterate the 
raw materials are neither 
available, known, or 
reported   
• Advanced technologies, 
methods, facilities and 
knowledge are required to 
adulterate the raw materials 
• Simple/basic technologies and 
methods are available, and no 
specialist facilities are required, to 
adulterate the raw materials 
• The knowledge required for 
adulteration is generally available 
3 How easily can 
adulteration of 
your raw materials 
be detected and 
with what kind of 
methods? 
Fraud detection is 
impeded when analysis of 
raw materials requires 
advanced laboratory 
methods and facilities or if 
methods are lacking, 
which in turn provide 
opportunities for potential 
offenders to commit fraud  
• Detection of adulteration 
of raw materials is 
straightforward and 
performed with 
common/simple methods 
(e.g. visual inspection, 
smelling) 
• Established on-site methods 
are available for fraud 
screening (e.g. test kits) but 
confirmation of adulteration 
requires additional testing 
• Detection and confirmation of 
adulteration of raw materials 
requires advanced laboratory 
analysis, or testing for adulteration 
is not available at all 
4 How available is 
the technology and 
knowledge to 
enable the 
adulteration of 
your final 
products? 
Generally available 
technology, methods and 
knowledge to 
adulterate/modify final 
products provides 
opportunities for potential 
offenders to commit fraud 
• No technologies and/or 
adulteration methods are 
known or available to 
adulterate final products 
• Advanced technologies, 
methods, facilities and 
knowledge are required to 
adulterate final products 
• Simple/basic technologies and 
methods are available, and no 
specialist facilities are required, to 
adulterate final products 
• The knowledge required for 
adulteration is generally available 
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5 How easily would 
adulteration of 
your final products 
be detected and 
what kind of 
methods are 
available? 
Fraud detection is 
impeded when analysis of 
final products requires 
advanced laboratory 
methods and facilities or if 
methods are lacking, 
which in turn provides 
opportunities for potential 
offenders to commit fraud  
• Detection of adulteration 
of final products is easy and 
performed with 
common/simple methods 
(e.g. visual inspection, 
smelling) 
• Established on-site methods 
are available for fraud 
screening (e.g. test kits) but 
confirmation of adulteration 
requires additional testing 
• Detection and confirmation of 
adulteration of final products 
requires advanced laboratory 
analyses, or testing for adulteration 
is not available at all 
6 How simple or 
complex is 
counterfeiting of 
your final product? 
The ease of counterfeiting 
of a product and general 
availability of technology/ 
methods/ facilities/ 
knowledge to do so 
provides opportunities for 
potential offenders to  
counterfeit 
• It is complex to 
counterfeit the product and 
technologies, methods, 
facilities and knowledge are 
not generally available 
• The product can be 
counterfeited but this 
requires advanced 
technologies, methods, 
facilities and/or knowledge 
• The product can easily be 
counterfeited and technologies, 
methods, facilities and knowledge 
are generally available 
7 How easily can 
counterfeiting of 
your final product 
be detected and 
what kind of 
methods are 
available? 
Detection of counterfeit 
products is impeded when 
analysis requires advanced 
laboratory methods and 
facilities or if methods are 
lacking, which in turn 
provides opportunities for 
potential offenders to 
commit fraud  
• Detection of counterfeit 
products is easy and 
performed with 
common/simple methods 
such as by visual inspection 
or smelling 
• Established and on-site 
methods are available for 
counterfeit screening (e.g. 
test kits) but confirmation of 
counterfeiting requires 
additional testing 
• Detection and confirmation of 
counterfeiting requires advanced 
laboratory analyses, or testing for 
counterfeiting is not available at all 
8 How would you 
describe the 
production lines / 
processing 
activities of your 
company? 
Production lines and 
processing activities which 
require frequent 
modification and allow 
easy interference, or 
include shifts without 
strict control and 
unauthorised access of 
personnel provide 
opportunities for potential 
offenders to commit fraud 
• Production lines and 
processing activities are 
characterised by continuous 
flow processes and minor 
equipment modifications 
between batches, with only 
authorised personnel access 
both day and night 
• Production lines and 
processing activities are 
characterised by large 
batches with minor 
equipment modifications 
between batches (repetitive 
flow), with the opportunity 
for unauthorised access to 
equipment but no night 
processing 
• Production lines and processing 
activities are characterised by 
relatively small batches with major 
modifications between batches 
(intermittent flow), and the 
opportunity for unauthorised 
access both during day and night 
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9 How would you 
describe your part 
of the food supply 
chain? 
A complex supply chain 
that lacks transparency, 
with short-term/ad-hoc 
relationships, and 
no/limited information 
exchange provides 
opportunities for fraud 
• The Supply chain is 
transparent, with good 
insight into suppliers and 
customers 
• The supply chain is not fully 
transparent; only direct 
suppliers and customer are 
known 
• The supply chain is complex and 
lacks transparency; typically 
customers and suppliers are 
geographically disbursed  
• Business relationships are 
long-term relationships and 
characterised by trust 
• Business relationships are 
variable; some relationships 
are long-term, others short-
term 
• Business relationships are ad-hoc 
and price is the main driver for 
selecting suppliers 
• The supply chain is 
integrated, well-
coordinated, with 
comprehensive information 
exchange across the supply 
chain 
• Some degree of integration 
exists across the supply chain; 
information exchange occurs 
mainly with direct suppliers 
and customers 
• No information exchange occurs 
between direct suppliers and 
customers 
10 Have fraudulent 
incidents of similar 
raw materials  
been reported? 
Reported fraudulent 
incidents with similar raw 
material, often 
accompanied by media 
attention, indicate 
opportunities for fraud 
• No fraudulent incidents 
related to raw materials are 
known 
• A few fraudulent incidents 
have occurred with specific 
raw materials 
• Many fraudulent incidents have 
occurred with specific raw materials 
• No documented 
evidence/information of 
fraud is available 
• Limited documentation and 
few/no media reports are 
available 
• Incidents are well known and 
documented, and have received 
substantial media attention 
11 Have fraudulent 
incidents of similar 
final products  
been reported? 
Reported fraudulent 
incidents with similar final 
products, often 
accompanied by media 
attention, indicate 
opportunities for fraud 
• No fraudulent incidents 
related to any final products 
are known 
• A few fraudulent incidents 
have occurred with specific 
final products 
• Many fraudulent incidents have 
occurred with specific final 
products 
• No documented 
evidence/information of 
fraud is available 
• Limited documentation and 
few/no media reports are 
available 
• Incidents are well known and 
documented, and have received 
substantial media attention 
12 How would you 
define the supply 
and pricing of your 
raw materials? 
Economic pressures on 
raw materials can 
motivate  offenders to 
commit fraud 
• Raw materials are readily 
available 
• Stable prices but the supply 
of raw materials is not readily 
available 
• Tight global supplies of raw 
materials and/or shortages exist 
• No export bans on raw 
materials exist 
• Export bans on raw materials exist 
in many countries 
• Prices for raw materials 
are stable 
• Export bans on raw 
materials exist in a few 
countries 
• Price spikes of raw materials are 
common 
• Pricing of raw materials is 
independent of 
geographical origin 
• Large differences in prices of 
materials from different 
geographical regions 
• Prices of substitute raw 
materials are equivalent 
  • Prices of substitute raw materials 
vary greatly 
 53 
13 Do special 
attributes or 
components 
determine the 
value of your raw 
materials? 
Value added by the 
composition of raw 
materials (e.g. protein 
content), production 
methods (e.g. organic) 
and/or geographical origin 
can motivate offenders to 
commit fraud 
• The value of raw materials 
is not determined by its 
composition, way of 
production or origin 
• The value of raw materials 
is influenced by its 
composition (e.g. protein or 
fat content) 
• Value of raw materials is greatly 
determined by its composition, way 
of production and/or origin 
14 How would you 
describe the 
economic 
condition of your 
company? 
The economic situation of 
a company can motivate 
employees to commit 
fraud for economic 
survival 
• The company is profitable, 
achieving its financial goals 
• Profits are declining and 
there is a gap between 
financial targets and actual 
performance 
• There are financial losses and it is 
difficult to meet financial targets 
15 What are the 
characteristics of 
the business 
strategy of your 
company? 
Short-term financial goals, 
with strong emphasis to 
achieve such goals and 
without specifying the 
(legitimate) means by 
which to achieve them can 
motivate employees to 
commit fraud 
• Long term financial 
targets, coupled with food 
quality and safety goals, and 
the means by which the 
objectives should be 
achieved, are well specified 
• Financial targets and food 
quality and safety goals are 
ambiguous 
• There is a strong emphasis to 
achieve (short-term) financial goals, 
while the means to achieve them 
legitimately is not specified • There's a lack of clarity 
about the means to achieve 
these objectives 
16 How would you 
describe the ethical 
business culture of 
your company? 
A poor ethical business 
culture can motivate 
employees to commit 
fraud 
• Mutual trust, interest & 
respect between all  
employees across the 
company 
• Mutual trust, interest and 
respect generally exists 
among employees but not 
across the entire company 
• There's a lack of mutual trust, 
interest & respect among 
employees 
• Standards, codes and 
requirements are taken 
seriously by all employees 
• Not all employees take 
standards, codes and 
requirements seriously but 
many do 
• Standards, codes and 
requirements are not taken 
seriously across the company 
• Discussions on unethical 
conduct & moral 
issues/dilemmas are 
common 
• Discussions on unethical 
conduct & moral 
issues/dilemmas is limited to 
major incidents only (i.e. ad 
hoc)  
• There are no discussions on 
unethical conduct & moral 
issues/dilemmas 
 54 
• Reports on unethical 
conduct are always taken 
seriously, and corrections of 
unethical activities are 
encouraged and 
acknowledged 
• Reports on unethical 
conduct are not taken 
seriously by all employees, 
and corrections of unethical 
conduct are not broadly 
acknowledged 
• Reports on unethical conduct are 
usually ignored, and corrections of 
unethical activities are neither 
encouraged nor acknowledged 
• Ethical conduct is highly 
valued and rewarded by 
senior management 
• Ethical conduct is not 
equally valued, nor rewarded 
by senior management 
• Ethical conduct is neither valued 
nor rewarded by senior 
management 
17 Has your company 
been involved in 
criminal offences 
previously? 
Companies that 
committed criminal 
offences previously have a 
higher risk of committing 
future offences 
• The company has not 
committed criminal offences 
or broken the law in the 
past 
• There is no information 
whether the company has 
committed criminal offences 
or broken the law in the past 
• The company has committed 
criminal offences and/or broken the 
law in the past 
18 How would you 
rate the corruption 
level (according to 
the Transparency 
International 
Corruption 
Perception Index) 
in the countries 
where your 
company is active? 
High levels of corruption in 
a country increases the 
risk of fraud  
• The company is active in 
countries with low levels of 
corruption (rated 1-25 on 
the Index) 
• The company is active in 
countries with medium levels 
of corruption (rated 26-75 on 
the Index) 
•  The company is active in 
countries with high levels of 
corruption (rated 76 and above on 
the Index) 
19 How would you 
describe the 
financial strains 
imposed by your 
company on your 
direct supplier(s) ? 
Financial strains imposed 
by companies on their 
direct supplier(s) can 
motivate the supplier to 
commit fraud  
• The company sets fixed 
prices for direct supplier(s) 
in line with market prices, 
and supplier(s) have other 
customers 
• The company typically buys 
from suppliers that offer the 
lowest price and suppliers are 
somewhat dependent on the 
company for their financial 
survival 
• The company always buys from 
suppliers that offer the lowest 
prices and suppliers are completely 
dependent on the company for 
their financial survival 
20 How would you 
describe the 
economic health of 
your direct 
supplier(s)? 
The economic situation of 
the company can motivate 
the supplier(s) to commit 
fraud for economic 
survival 
• The supplier(s) is 
profitable and achieving its 
financial targets 
• The supplier(s) profits are 
declining, and there is a gap 
between their financial 
targets and actual 
performance 
• There are financial losses and it is 
difficult to meet financial targets 
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21 What are the 
characteristics of 
the business 
strategy of your 
direct supplier(s) ? 
Short-term financial goals, 
with strong emphasis to 
achieve such goals and 
without specifying the 
(legitimate) means by 
which to achieve them can 
motivate suppliers to 
commit fraud 
• Long term financial 
targets, coupled with food 
quality and safety goals, and 
the means by which the 
objectives should be 
achieved, are well specified 
• Financial targets and food 
quality and safety goals are 
ambiguous, and there's a lack 
of clarity about the means to 
achieve these objectives 
• There is a strong emphasis to 
achieve (short-term) financial goals, 
while the means to achieve them 
legitimately is not specified 
22 How would you 
describe the ethical 
business culture of 
your direct 
supplier(s) ? 
Poor ethical business 
culture of companies can 
motivate potential 
offenders to commit fraud 
• Mutual trust, interest & 
respect between all  
employees across the 
company 
• Mutual trust, interest and 
respect generally exists 
among employees but not 
across the entire company 
• There's a lack of mutual trust, 
interest & respect among 
employees 
• Standards, codes and 
requirements are taken 
seriously by all employees 
• Not all employees take 
standards, codes and 
requirements seriously but 
many do 
• Standards, codes and 
requirements are not taken 
seriously across the company 
• Discussions on unethical 
conduct & moral 
issues/dilemmas are 
common 
• Discussions on unethical 
conduct & moral 
issues/dilemmas is limited to 
major incidents only (i.e. ad 
hoc)  
• There are no discussions on 
unethical conduct & moral 
issues/dilemmas 
• Reports on unethical 
conduct are always taken 
seriously, and corrections of 
unethical activities are 
encouraged and 
acknowledged 
• Reports on unethical 
conduct are not taken 
seriously by all employees, 
and corrections of unethical 
conduct are not broadly 
acknowledged 
• Reports on unethical conduct are 
usually ignored, and corrections of 
unethical activities are neither 
encouraged nor acknowledged 
• Ethical conduct is highly 
valued and rewarded by 
senior management 
• Ethical conduct is not 
equally valued, nor rewarded 
by senior management 
• Ethical conduct is neither valued 
nor rewarded by senior 
management 
23 Has your direct 
supplier(s) been 
involved in 
criminal offences 
previously ? 
Companies that 
committed criminal 
offences previously have a 
higher risk of committing 
future offences 
• The supplier has not 
committed criminal offences 
or broken the law in the 
past 
• There is no information 
whether the supplier has 
committed criminal offences 
or broken the law in the past 
• The supplier has committed 
criminal offences and/or broken the 
law in the past 
• The supplier may have been 
committed criminal offences 
or broken the law in the past 
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24 Has your direct 
supplier(s) been a 
victim of food 
fraud committed 
by their suppliers, 
customers or other 
parties? 
When a direct supplier has 
been a victim of  food 
fraud there is a higher risk 
to your company 
• The supplier has not been 
a victim of food fraud in the 
past 
There is no information 
available as to whether the 
supplier has been a victim of 
food fraud in the past 
The supplier has been a victim of 
food fraud in the past 
25 How would you 
rate the corruption 
level (according to 
the Transparency 
International 
Corruption 
Perception Index) 
in the countries 
where your direct 
supplier(s) and 
customers are 
active? 
High levels of corruption in 
a country increases the 
risk of fraud  
• Suppliers and customers 
are active in countries with 
low levels of corruption 
• Suppliers and customers are 
active in countries with 
medium levels of corruption 
• Suppliers and customers are 
active in countries with high levels 
of corruption 
26 How would you 
describe the 
economic health 
across your sector 
of the food supply 
chain (i.e. your 
company and your 
direct 
competitors)? 
The economic situation 
across your sector can 
motivate offenders to 
commit fraud 
• The company operates in 
a growing market(s) 
• The company operates in a 
stable market  
• The company operates in a 
declining market(s) 
• The company operates in 
growing and declining 
markets 
27 Has your 
customer(s) been 
involved in 
criminal offences 
previously ? 
Customers that committed 
criminal offences 
previously have a higher 
risk of committing future 
offences 
• The supplier has not 
committed criminal offences 
or broken the law in the 
past 
• There is no information 
whether the customer has 
committed criminal offences 
or broken the law in the past 
• The customer has committed 
criminal offences and/or broken the 
law in the past 
• The customer may have 
been committed criminal 
offences or broken the law in 
the past 
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28 How would you 
describe the ethical 
business culture 
across your sector 
of the food supply 
chain (i.e. your 
company and your 
direct 
competitors)? 
Poor ethical business 
culture in a branch of 
industry can motivate 
potential offenders to 
commit fraud 
• Branch of industry culture 
is characterised by a high 
level of mutual trust and 
respect, ethical discussions 
and ethical conduct is highly 
valued between companies 
• Branch of industry culture is 
characterised by overall 
mutual trust, limited and ad 
hoc ethical discussions and 
ethical conduct is moderately 
valued between companies 
• Branch of industry culture is 
characterised by lack of mutual 
trust & interests, restricted/no 
moral/ethical discussions and 
ethical conduct is not valued 
between companies 
29 How common are 
criminal offences 
across your sector 
of the food supply 
chain? (i.e. your 
company and your 
direct 
competitors)? 
Criminal offences that 
have occurred previously 
across the sector have a 
higher risk of reoccurring 
and impacting your 
company 
• There is no evidence of 
fraudulent activity or other 
forms of law breaking in our 
sector 
• There may have been 
incidents of fraud across the 
sector but there is no specific 
information available 
• There is well-known and 
documented evidence of fraudulent 
activity across our sector of the 
food industry 
30 How would you 
rate the level of 
competition across 
your sector of the 
food supply chain 
(i.e. your company 
and your direct 
competitors)? 
A high level of competition 
in a sector of the food 
industry may result in 
difficulties to reach 
financial goals by 
legitimate means, which 
can motivate potential 
offenders to commit fraud  
• Low levels of competition 
across the sector 
• Medium levels of 
competition across the sector 
• Highly competitive sector of the 
food industry 
31 Are there price 
differences as a 
result of regulatory 
differences across 
countries? 
Price differences as a 
result of different 
regulation across 
countries can motivate 
potential offenders to 
commit fraud 
• The price policy of food 
ingredients and food 
products is similar for all 
countries 
• The price policy of food 
ingredients and food products 
is different in some countries 
• The price policy of food 
ingredients and food products 
varies considerably across different 
countries 
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32 How would you 
rate your 
company's raw 
material 
monitoring control 
systems' ability to 
detect fraud? 
Detectability of 
adulterated and/or 
suspicious raw materials is 
enhanced when 
companies have a 
structured incoming 
material control system 
that includes: an evidence-
based sampling plan for 
fraud detection; accurate 
and specific fraud 
detection methods; 
specific fraud monitoring 
procedures; and 
systematic record-keeping 
and documentation as an 
integral part of their FSMS 
• Sampling plan only for 
safety and quality analyses 
but not for fraud check 
• No systematic ad-hoc 
sampling for fraud analysis 
• Systematic, evidence-based (using 
both historical and scientific data) 
sampling plan for fraud-related 
analyses 
•  No methods for fraud 
detection in place; external 
fraud analysis only in case of 
inspection demands/fraud 
issues 
• General screening (quick) 
methods in place but no 
(external) confirmatory fraud 
testing 
• Specific fraud screening methods 
and systematic use of fit-for-
purpose confirmatory techniques 
(in house or in collaboration with 
accredited laboratories) 
•  No procedures for fraud 
monitoring tasks  
• General procedure for 
sampling and screening for 
monitoring of ingredient/raw 
material fraud issues 
• Customised procedures for fraud 
monitoring and handling of non-
conformities 
•  No record keeping on 
adulterated or suspicious 
raw materials, and no 
documentation of fraud 
procedures 
• Record-keeping in case of 
deviations; limited 
documentation on fraud 
monitoring 
procedures/systems 
• Systematic record keeping and 
detailed documentation of fraud 
monitoring procedures & systems  
33 Are the fraud 
monitoring tasks of 
your raw material 
control system 
verified in your 
company? 
Systematic verification of 
fraud monitoring tasks at 
incoming material control, 
i.e. based on document & 
record analysis, 
observations, and actual 
testing by an autonomous 
controller enhances 
discovery of non-
compliance practices is 
enhanced and assures 
adequate performance of 
the fraud monitoring tasks 
• No verification of fraud 
monitoring tasks at 
incoming material control 
• Ad-hoc and or announced 
verification of fraud 
monitoring tasks; mainly 
based on analysis of records 
and check of presence of 
procedures (e.g. as part of 
auditing) 
• Systematic and comprehensive 
verification (document & record 
analysis, observations, and actual 
testing), unannounced and 
performed by autonomous 
controller of fraud monitoring tasks 
• Ad-hoc reporting of 
verification outcomes; mainly 
in case of deviations 
• Systematic documentation of 
verification activities and outcomes 
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34 How would you 
describe the fraud 
related parts of 
your final product 
monitoring control 
system of your 
company? 
A structured monitoring 
system for fraud detection 
in final products with an 
evidence based sampling 
plan for fraud detection, 
accurate and specific fraud 
detection methods, and 
fraud specific procedures 
and systematic record-
keeping and 
documentation as integral 
part of their FSMS 
enhances detectability of 
internal fraudulent 
practices  
•  Sampling plan only for 
safety and quality analyses 
but not for authenticity 
check 
• No systematic, ad-hoc 
sampling for fraud analysis 
• Systematic, evidence-based (using 
both historical and scientific data) 
sampling plan for fraud-related 
analyses 
•  No methods for fraud 
detection in place; external 
authenticity analysis only  in 
case of inspection 
demands/fraud issues 
• General screening (quick) 
methods in place but no or 
ad-hoc (external) 
confirmatory fraud testing 
• Specific fraud screening methods 
and systematic use of  fit-for-
purpose confirmatory techniques 
(in house or in collaboration with 
accredited laboratory) 
•  No procedures for fraud 
monitoring tasks  
• General procedure for 
sampling and screening for 
ad-hoc monitoring of 
products for fraud issues 
• Customised procedures for fraud 
monitoring and handling of non- 
conformities 
•  No record keeping on 
adulterated or suspicious 
raw materials and no 
documentation of fraud 
procedures 
• Mainly record-keeping in 
case of deviations; limited 
documentation on fraud 
monitoring 
procedures/system 
• Systematic-record keeping and 
detailed documentation of fraud 
monitoring procedures & fraud 
monitoring system design  
35 Are the fraud 
monitoring tasks of 
your final product 
control system 
verified in your 
company? 
Systematic verification of 
compliance to final 
product monitoring tasks 
(sampling, laboratory 
analysis, corrective 
actions, record-keeping & 
documentation) based on 
document & record 
analysis, observations, and 
actual testing by an 
autonomous controller (no 
conflicting interest) 
enhances discovery of 
systematic deviations 
• No verification of actual 
compliance to monitoring 
tasks at final product control 
• Ad hoc and/or announced 
verification of compliance to 
monitoring tasks mainly 
based on analysis of records 
and check of presence of 
procedures (e.g. as part of 
auditing) 
• Systematic, comprehensive 
(document & record analysis, 
observations, and actual 
verification testing) and 
unannounced  verification by 
autonomous controller 
• Ad-hoc reporting of 
verification outcomes; mainly 
in case of deviations 
• Systematic documentation of 
verification activities and outcomes 
36 How extensive is 
the information 
system for internal 
control of mass 
balance flows in 
your company? 
Systematically collected, 
accurate information on 
mass balance flows of all 
raw materials, ingredients, 
and final products 
throughout the company 
• Basic administrative 
system with limited 
information or no specific 
information on mass 
balances of  incoming 
materials and final products 
• Process monitoring 
information system with 
accurate information on mass 
balances of mainly bulk 
ingredients 
• Established and comprehensive 
(accurate mass balance data, of all 
crucial ingredients, materials, & 
final product flows)  process 
monitoring information system 
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(including internal 
suppliers) and 
systematically analysis of 
the integral dataset, 
enhances discovery of 
flaws in mass balances, 
and provides evidence of 
fraud control (assurance) 
dedicated for control of mass 
balance flows 
• Data only analysed in case 
of inspection requirements 
• No integral analysis of mass 
flow data throughout the 
company (including internal 
suppliers) 
• Structured record keeping of 
mass flow information and 
systematic analysis of integral data 
of whole company (including 
internal suppliers) 
37 How extensive is 
the tracking & 
tracing system of 
your company? 
An integrated tracking and 
tracing system including 
clearly defined traceability 
resource units, collection 
of accurate and fraud-
relevant information from 
direct supplier up to direct 
customer (one up - one 
down), and a robust data 
capturing and data 
retrieval system, enhances 
tracing and tracking of 
suspicious 
products/batches, and 
limits (safety, economic, 
brand) damage in case of 
fraud 
• Traceability system 
without clearly defined 
traceability resource units 
or units cannot be exactly 
defined (e.g. because of 
continuous flow). 
• System with clearly defined 
traceability resource units; 
Collection of accurate 
information but not 
specifically addressing fraud 
issues, only information on 
company level 
• System with clearly defined 
traceability resource units (product 
level; collection of accurate 
information including fraud-
relevant issues from direct supplier 
up to direct customer 
• Uncertainty about 
accuracy of information, and  
limited/no fraud relevant 
information 
• Computer-based data 
capturing & retrieval system 
but not systematically 
controlled (restricted 
possibilities for fraud) 
• Advanced automated and 
systematically controlled robust 
data capturing and data retrieval 
system (fraud proof) 
• Data capturing and 
retrieval system is not fraud 
proof 
    
38 Is integrity 
screening of 
employees 
common 
procedure in your 
company? 
Application of 
acknowledged integrity 
screening methods for 
employment of personnel 
enhances identification of 
future employees prone to 
unethical behaviour  
• No integrity screening of 
employees 
• Use of established integrity 
screening methods for 
employees at key positions 
• Use of established integrity 
screening methods is standard for 
employment of all personnel 
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39 Is there an ethical 
code of conduct or 
guideline in place 
and embedded in 
your company? 
A transparent and specific 
ethical code of conduct or 
guidelines that is widely 
communicated and well 
embedded in 
management activities 
enhances prevention of 
unethical behaviour 
• No written code of ethical 
conduct or guideline exist 
• General written code of 
ethical conduct or guidelines 
is available, but awareness 
amongst all personnel is 
limited, and or code is not 
explicitly embedded in 
management activities 
• Detailed written code of ethical 
conduct or guideline is available 
and well embedded; awareness 
amongst all personnel is stimulated 
(e.g. posters, communication) and 
demonstrated in management 
activities 
40 Is there a whistle 
blowing system 
(system for 
reporting assumed 
fraudulent 
activities) in place 
in your company?  
A well-designed and 
implemented whistle 
blowing system, including 
an independent officer 
and protection system for 
whistle blowing, enhances 
discovery of fraudulent 
activities 
• No whistle blowing system 
exists 
• Whistle blowing system is 
available, but no clear 
protection system for the 
whistle blower is in place, and 
reporting of fraudulent 
activity goes to supervisor (no 
independent officer) 
• Whistle blowing system is well-
established and well-known among 
personnel, fraudulent practices can 
be reported to an independent 
officer, and anonymity of the 
whistle blower is strictly protected 
41 Do contractual 
requirements with 
your direct 
suppliers include 
elements that limit 
opportunities for 
fraud?  
Established, 
comprehensive 
contractual requirements 
explicitly addressing fraud 
prevention enhance the 
prevention of fraudulent 
practices 
• Contractual requirements 
for direct suppliers are 
mainly set on logistic 
parameters: cost, amount 
and availability 
• Contractual requirements 
are established together with 
direct supplier(s) for both 
logistic and safety & quality 
parameters 
• Comprehensive contractual 
requirements established in close 
collaboration with direct supplier(s) 
addressing logistics, safety and 
quality, but also requirements on 
adoption of ethical code/guidelines, 
and adoption of similar technical 
fraud control measures 
42 What best 
describes the fraud 
control system of 
your direct 
supplier(s)?    
Suppliers with well-
designed and 
systematically audited 
Food Safety Management 
Systems that include 
dedicated fraud control 
measures enhances 
detectability of fraudulent 
products supplied to your 
company 
• Direct supplier(s) don’t 
have a FSMS or the FSMS is 
limited (not audited 
externally, no fraud 
measures in place) 
• Direct supplier(s) has a well 
established FSMS in place 
that is regularly audited by a 
3rd party and uses basic fraud 
screening methods  
• Direct supplier(s) has a well 
established FSMS in place that is 
regularly audited by a 3rd party and 
systematically uses fraud screening 
methods and confirmatory tests to 
identify suspicious materials NOTE:  As an 
alternative to 
answering this 
question yourself, 
direct suppliers can 
fill out the tool 
themselves with 
respect to the 
control measures 
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as defined by the 
company 
43 How extensive is 
the information 
system for control 
of mass balance 
flows of your direct 
supplier(s)?  
An advanced information 
system to control mass 
balance flows in the 
supplying company 
enhances discovery of 
problems in their mass 
balances and provide 
evidence of fraud control 
(assurance) to your 
company 
• A basic administrative 
system exists with 
limited/no specific 
information on mass 
balance flows of  incoming 
materials and final products 
• A process monitoring 
information system exists 
with accurate information on 
mass balance flows of bulk 
ingredients only 
• An established and 
comprehensive process monitoring 
information system exists dedicated 
to the control of mass balance 
flows (accurate mass balance data, 
of all crucial ingredients, materials, 
& final product flows) 
NOTE: This 
question can be 
only asked directly 
of the supplier(s) 
• Data only analysed in case 
of inspection requirements 
• No integral analysis of mass 
data flow across the company 
(including internal suppliers) 
• Structured record keeping of 
mass data flow and systematic 
analysis of integral data across the 
company (including internal 
suppliers) 
44 How extensive is 
the traceability 
system of your 
direct supplier(s)?  
Suppliers with well-
designed and audited 
traceability systems that 
systematically 
communicate accurate 
and fraud-relevant 
information to your 
company, enhances 
traceability of suspicious 
products/batches and 
limits damage in case of 
fraud 
• Direct supplier(s) have a 
basic traceability system 
because of legal  
requirements but it not 
designed according to best 
practice nor audited by a 
3rd party 
• Direct supplier(s) have a 
traceability system in place 
for safety issues that is based 
on a recognised standard and 
audited by a 3rd party 
• Direct supplier(s) have a 
traceability system for safety issues 
based on a certified QA scheme(s) 
and based on contractual 
requirements as set and audited 
(2nd part) by your company; 
systematic, accurate and fraud 
relevant information exchange to 
your company 
NOTE:  As an 
alternative to 
answering this 
question yourself, 
direct suppliers can 
fill out the tool 
themselves with 
respect to the 
tracking & tracing 
system as defined 
by the company 
• Direct supplier(s) have a 
simple data capturing and 
retrieval system and there is 
no communication about 
deviations 
• Direct supplier(s) have a 
simple digital data capturing 
and retrieval system, and 
information about suspicious 
materials is communicated ad 
hoc 
• Direct supplier(s) have advanced 
digital robust data capturing 
system; fraud proof 
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45 How would you 
describe the social 
control and 
transparency of 
actions across your 
supply chain? 
Extensive self-regulation 
and social control across 
the supply chain and 
transparent 
feedback/actions on 
criminal offences reduces 
opportunities and motives 
for potential offenders 
and enhances detectability 
of fraudulent behaviour 
• No self-regulation and 
poor communication 
between companies across 
the supply chain 
• The supply chain has a 
certain degree of self-
regulation but 
communication depends on 
individual companies (i.e. not 
systematic) 
• The supply chain self-regulates 
and communication between 
companies is very active 
• Limited/no self-regulating 
tools (e.g. code of conduct, 
certification scheme) exist, 
limited/no monitoring on 
compliance 
• Self-regulating tools (e.g. 
code of conduct, certification 
scheme) exist but are not 
widely implemented and 
compliance is not monitored 
systematically 
• Self-regulating tools (e.g. code of 
conduct, certification scheme) are 
widely implemented and 
compliance is monitored 
systematically 
• Unethical conduct is rarely 
communicated 
• Only serious/obvious 
unethical conduct and/or 
incidents are communicated 
• All unethical conduct is 
systematically communicated 
across the supply chain and 
information is widely shared 
46 How well 
established is 
guidance for fraud 
prevention and 
control across your 
sector of the food 
supply chain? (i.e. 
your company and 
your direct 
competitors) 
Active communication of 
fraud incidents as well as 
guidelines, best practices 
and fraud monitoring and 
mitigation activates by 
companies supports the 
effectiveness of fraud 
monitoring systems 
•  No specific guidelines for 
fraud mitigation exist, or 
they are not shared; 
guidelines focus on safety 
only 
• General guidelines (mainly 
via websites) for fraud 
mitigation measures are 
available, but there are no 
examples of best practices of 
mitigation measures 
• Specific guidelines and examples 
of best practices for fraud 
monitoring and mitigation are 
provided actively via website, 
training, information brochures and 
other mediums  
47 How would you 
describe your 
national food 
policy? (i.e. 
country-level)  
National food policy is the 
basis for legal controls. 
National food policy 
specifically addressing 
fraud and harmonised 
with internationally 
recognised 
recommendations enables 
systematic and consistent 
controls for food fraud 
mitigation 
• Only a general national 
food policy exists without 
specific legislative 
requirements for food fraud 
mitigation 
• National food policy with 
generally defined legislation 
for food fraud mitigation but 
it is not harmonised with 
internationally recognised 
recommendations for food 
fraud mitigation 
• Well established national food 
policy with detailed specifically 
defined legislation to mitigate 
against food fraud that is 
harmonised with internationally 
recognised recommendations for 
food fraud mitigation 
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48 How well are fraud 
prevention laws 
enforced locally? 
National enforcement 
practices specifically 
aimed at food fraud and 
systematically supported 
by fines/sanctions helps to 
expand control measures 
and enhances fraud 
detection and prevention 
• No national fraud related 
enforcement practices exist 
• Fraud-related enforcement 
practices exist but with low 
frequency of inspections by 
regulatory/law enforcement 
agencies 
• Systematic fraud-related 
enforcement practices with risk-
based frequency of inspections by 
regulatory/law enforcement 
agencies 
• Very limited or no 
fines/sanctions 
• Low level of fines/sanctions 
with little financial impact  
• High level of fines/sanctions with 
substantial financial impact 
49 How well are fraud 
related laws 
enforced across 
your international 
supply chain? 
National enforcement 
practices aimed at food 
fraud aligned across links 
of the international supply 
chain, supported by 
fines/sanctions, increases 
the effectiveness of 
control measures and 
enhances fraud detection 
• Fraud related 
enforcement practices are 
lacking at most stages 
across the international 
supply chain 
• Fraud related enforcement 
practices exist across parts of 
the international supply chain 
but the frequency of 
inspections by regulatory/law 
enforcement agencies varies 
• Fraud related enforcement 
practices are aligned across all 
stages of the international supply 
chain with risk-based frequency of 
inspections by regulatory/law 
enforcement agencies 
• Little or no fines/sanctions 
and the financial impact is 
minimal 
• Fines/sanctions vary 
considerably across the 
international supply chain 
• High level of fines/sanctions with 
substantial financial impact 
50 Does your 
company have 
fraud contingency 
measures in place? 
An integrated 
risk/contingency plan for 
both fraud and food safety 
issues that is science-
based, well documented 
and updated regularly can 
diminish the impact and 
consequences of fraud 
issues (internal or 
external) 
• No documented 
risk/contingency plan for 
fraud issues is in place 
• A documented 
risk/contingency plan is in 
place with communication 
principles and tools for safety 
issues and recalls, but fraud 
issues not explicitly addressed 
• An integrated risk/contingency 
plan for both fraud and safety 
issues is in place, with detailed 
communication principles and tools 
that are well documented and 
updated regularly 
 
 
